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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Homeownership is an enduring and fundamental American tradition.  Its 
economic and social benefits are well examined and have received renewed 
attention in recent articles and books.1  Homeownership is encouraged by 
favorable tax laws,2 protected by homestead and property laws,3 and 
vigorously defended against eminent domain attempts.4  This symposium 
critically examines the continuing primacy of homeownership—including the 
corollary effects on wealth creation—in light of the recent general economic 
downturn and the resulting impact on the housing sector.  The economic and 
housing crises have forced commentators and policymakers to reexamine the 
connection between traditional conceptions of homeownership and economic 
stability, particularly for low-income residents.5
 
 1. See, e.g., D. Benjamin Barros, Home as a Legal Concept, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 255, 
259, 276–77 (2006) (examining the underlying bases for legal protections accorded houses); Lee 
Anne Fennell, Homeownership 2.0, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1047, 1054 (2008) (“Households desire 
homeownership for many reasons: it delivers a stable stream of housing consumption, a large 
degree of personal control over the residence, access to superior housing stock and public 
services, important tax advantages, and unparalleled social and status benefits.”); Tim Iglesias, 
Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and the Struggle for Affordability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 511, 
518–19 (2007) (identifying “five housing” ethics that have influenced housing policy); Margaret 
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) (citing a house as an 
example of property closely connected with personhood); Stephanie M. Stern, Residential 
Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093, 1095–1098, 1110 
(2009) (challenging the “psychological primacy” of the home and consequent home protection 
legislation); Joan Williams, The Rhetoric of Property, 83 IOWA L. REV. 277, 326–329 (1998) 
(describing “[America’s] Romance of the Single-Family House”). See generally WILLIAM A. 
FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES (2001) (describing 
homeowners’ incentives and desires to affect local amenities); LEE ANNE FENNELL, THE 
UNBOUNDED HOME: PROPERTY VALUES BEYOND PROPERTY LINES (2009) (describing the value 
links between individual home purchasers and the communities they live in). 
  This article questions the 
 2. Federal tax law permits homeowners to deduct mortgage interest payments and property 
taxes.  I.R.C. § 163(h) (2006); § 164(a). 
 3. State homestead laws protect some or all of the equity in a debtor’s home from the reach 
of creditors.  See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 41.001–41.024 (2000 & Supp. 2008) 
(protecting all of a debtor’s equity).  In some states, married couples can elect to hold their home 
as tenants by the entirety, which shields the home from many creditor claims of one spouse.  See 
John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law Marital Estate, 
1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 46 (1997). 
 4. In Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 483–84 (2005), the U.S. Supreme Court 
validated economic development as a sufficient public use under the Fifth Amendment to justify 
an eminent domain action.  Many states enacted legislation making eminent domain against 
homes harder to accomplish.  See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. I, § 19(b) (severely limiting eminent 
domain actions against owner-occupied residences). 
 5. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home 
Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 84 IND. L.J. 189, 213–20, 232–37 (2009) (evaluating 
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traditional conception of homeownership by exploring how local governments, 
in an effort to promote regulatory land use goals, frequently place limitations 
on the power of homeowners to freely alienate property.  This article further 
explores whether these locally imposed restrictions on alienation would be 
effective policy tools if employed to combat residential real estate speculation.  
A potential anti-speculation ordinance would not allow investor purchasers to 
rent their homes for a prescribed period.  To the extent residential real estate 
speculation harms local communities, would such an ordinance increase the 
economic stability of neighborhoods? 
I focus on rental restrictions on homeowners for two primary reasons.  
First, the right to freely alienate “ownership” of property is one of the 
conventional hallmarks of property.6  Given the importance of alienability in 
legal conceptions of homeownership, there are a surprising number and variety 
of restrictions on the alienability of homes across communities nationwide.7  
This assortment of existing rental restrictions suggests they are effective at 
promoting home ownership directly, as well as the values associated with 
home ownership and owner occupancy.  Second, reactions to the housing crisis 
and its effect on borrowers and communities have largely focused on the 
activities of lenders, individual borrowers, and state and national regulators.8
 
home ownership policies that created the mortgage crisis and proposing reforms); Rachel D. 
Godsil & David V. Simunovich, Protecting Status: The Mortgage Crisis, Eminent Domain, and 
the Ethic of Homeownership, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 949, 995–97 (2008) (examining the effects of 
the economic crisis on conceptions of homeownership and rationales for government protection 
of homeowners). 
  
 6. I have written elsewhere about whether anti-speculation restrictions would be 
impermissible restraints on alienation under the common law.  See Ngai Pindell, Fear and 
Loathing: Combating Speculation in Local Communities, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 543, 576–77 
(2006) (noting the Restatement (Third) of Property focuses on reasonableness).  Although the 
issue was sometimes discussed in dicta, none of the rental restriction examples in this article were 
struck down because they were impermissible restraints on alienation.  See, e.g., Anderson v. 
Provo City Corp, 108 P.3d 701, 709–10 (Utah 2005). 
 7. See discussion infra Part II.A–H.  This article does not include a discussion of 
restrictions contained in condominium community bylaws.  Owner occupancy restrictions in 
condominiums are more commonplace.  See, e.g., Apple Valley Gardens Ass’n, Inc. v. MacHutta, 
763 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Wis. 2009) (upholding amendment to condominium bylaws requiring 
owner occupancy of units); Jordan I. Shifrin, No-Leasing Restrictions on Condominium Owners: 
The Legal Landscape, 94 ILL. B.J. 80, 80 (2006) (“Condominium associations in large numbers 
are adopting provisions that eliminate rental units and forbid absentee ownership.”). 
 8. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Over-Indebtedness, the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, and 
the Effect on U.S. Cities, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 395, 395–410 (2009) (discussing rising 
consumer debt levels); Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory 
Lending by Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 
AM. U. L. REV. 515 (2006) (discussing tension between federal and state regulation of predatory 
lending); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates 
and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 CONN. L. REV. 963 (2009) (discussing the 
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The dialogue has not included what local communities, including governments, 
could do to prevent or mitigate such a crisis.9
Rental restrictions are an existing local land use tool that could be 
reconceived to address real estate speculation problems exposed by the 
housing crisis.  Residential real estate speculation, combined with other 
economic trends and lending practices, poses a possible threat to the economic 
stability of residential communities.  Speculative purchases have exacerbated 
the wild inflation of housing prices over the last decade, making many 
communities unattainable for low-income families.
 
10
In an earlier article, I explored whether a mandatory holding period would 
be useful as an anti-speculative policy.
  When the real estate 
bubble burst, individual borrowers, communities, cities, and renters were hurt. 
11
These restrictions, however, create three primary challenges.  First, it is 
necessary to identify the type of rental—long or short-term—in order to 
distinguish between a speculator and a long-term investor.  Second, purchases 
should be viewed in the context of a speculation-fueled rising market, rather 
than in the aftermath of a collapsed market.  This article assumes that 
  In this article, I examine the number 
and breadth of rental restrictions nationwide, the efficacy of rental restrictions 
generally, and their potential role in creating an effective anti-speculation 
policy.  I argue that rental restrictions on speculative purchases could reduce 
speculation by eliminating the opportunity for investors to purchase a property, 
lease it for one to two years to a short-term renter, and then resell the property 
at a higher price.  In other words, short-term renters could not subsidize the 
investor’s purchase. 
 
role of large lenders); PEW CTR. ON THE STATES & PEW HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 
PROGRAM, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, DEFAULTING ON THE DREAM: STATES RESPOND TO 
AMERICA’S FORECLOSURE CRISIS (2008), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpew 
trustsorg/Reports/Subprime_mortgages/defaulting_on_the_dream.pdf (collecting state policies 
addressing the impacts of foreclosure). 
 9. There has been some scholarship on cities’ efforts against predatory lending.  See 
generally Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory 
Lending, 38 CONN. L. REV. 355 (2006) (analyzing whether cities have standing to bring suit for 
damages caused by predatory lenders); Ngai Pindell, The Fair Housing Act at Forty: Predatory 
Lending and the City as Plaintiff, 18 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 169 
(2009) (exploring opportunities for a broader range of FHA suits with the city as plaintiff); John 
P. Relman, Foreclosures, Integration, and the Future of the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 
629 (2008) (further discussing the city as a plaintiff in predatory lending suits). 
 10. Pindell, supra note 6, at 543–45 (discussing rising prices in Las Vegas fueled by 
speculation on residential housing). 
 11. Id. at 546–47.  Cf. George Lefcoe, How “Spec” Condo and Tract Home Buyers Helped 
Sink Our Housing and Finance Markets: Should the Alienability of Their Interests Be Restrained 
By Law?, 36 J. ON LEGISLATION (2009) (focusing on the deceptive acts of spec buyers in 
violation of state and federal laws and cautioning against restraining spec buyers by limiting the 
alienation of houses). 
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speculator purchasers harmed the rising housing market of a few years ago and 
therefore the market would have been better if the speculators would have been 
excluded.  In the aftermath of a collapsed market, a different evaluation of 
purchasers is required.  Third, the focus of the examination must be on the 
negative effects of speculation, rather than on arguments about the perceived 
negative impacts of renters themselves on communities.  Local governments 
would craft rental restrictions to limit speculators, and not to limit the number 
of renters in the community. 
To illustrate these challenges, Part II examines a variety of rental 
restrictions throughout the country.  Part III then attempts to respond to these 
challenges within the context of real estate speculation.  My goal is not 
necessarily to convince policy makers and courts that the scope of rental 
restrictions should be expanded to include curbs on speculative purchases.  
Political and economic objections to such an expansion would be strong.  
Given this symposium’s exploration of the connection between 
homeownership and economic stability, it is instead appropriate to challenge 
the assumption that traditional homeownership includes, without question, the 
right to alienate property in a way that may be detrimental to the larger 
community.  By deconstructing this “alienation norm,” I hope to identify 
regulatory spaces to enable local governments to better regulate housing to 
protect communities from the harms of market crashes while preserving the 
community-building and wealth-building characteristics of home ownership. 
In this article, I attempt to strike the proper balance of legal protections 
concerning homeownership.  Do we over protect traditional conceptions of 
homeownership at the expense of other important values?12  If the answer is 
yes, then do limitations on owners’ alienation rights achieve worthwhile goals?  
Or are we perhaps offering owners too little in terms of ownership options?  
Owners may need more flexibility in the compromise between shelter and 
commodity, or between on-site and off-site risk factors.13
This article also focuses on rental restrictions in an attempt to deconstruct a 
monolithic version of homeownership in which the home is a domain free from 
  These questions of 
“too much” or “too little” suggest that the issues of rental restrictions and 
limits on speculation are ones that jurisdictions will soon be compelled to 
reconsider. 
 
 12. One examination argues that psychological, sociological, and demographic data does not 
support the breadth of legal protections for homes.  Stern, supra note 1, at 1110–11, 1120.  
Similarly, other property protections, such as homestead exemptions and rent control, may under-
protect creditors or other members of the community.  Barros, supra note 1, at 284–290. 
 13. Fennell, supra note 1, at 1048 (“Current legal arrangements make homeowners high-
stakes gamblers.”). 
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outside interference and regulation,14
II.  VARIETIES OF RENTAL RESTRICTIONS 
 and a commodity that should be 
protected to maximize its economic value.  Rental restrictions—limitations on 
a classic, fundamental right of alienation for homeowners—are frequently used 
to achieve a number of policy goals.  The question, then, is whether anti-
speculation should be one of these goals. 
Rental restrictions can be organized by both the entity that imposes the 
regulation, and by the characterization of the regulation.  The following chart 
and the remainder of this section begin with a regime with minimal or no 
restrictions on the rental of single-family housing, and end with a regime of 
heavy restrictions on rentals in a community burdened by restrictive covenants.  
In each of these regimes, regulating actors attempt to balance the demands of 
individual property owners with concerns about community character.15  A 
common failing of arguments supporting community character, however, is 
that they often cast renters as undesirable community members—a view this 
article does not endorse.16
 
 14. In examining takings law through three models of property, Joseph Singer includes 
several historical annotations to the phrase “A man’s house is his castle” including a 1644 
attribution to Sir Edward Coke and a 1768 attribution to William Blackstone.  See generally 
Joseph Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just 
Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309 (2006) (examining three models of property to flesh 
out the takings doctrine). 
  Negative impacts on a community commonly 
 15. Rent control provisions limiting the amount of rent a landlord can charge a tenant may 
also affect rental decisions.  The use of rent control to preserve affordable housing is examined in 
Peter Salsich, State and Local Regulation Promoting Affordable Housing, in THE LEGAL GUIDE 
TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 73, 110–12 (Tim Iglesias & Rochelle E. Lento eds., 
2005).  The propriety of rent control legislation is examined in Richard A. Epstein, Rent Control 
and the Theory of Efficient Regulation, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 741 (1988) (arguing that rent control 
statutes are unconstitutional) and in several responses.  See, e.g., W. Dennis Keating, 
Commentary on “Rent Control and the Theory of Efficient Regulation,”  54 BROOK. L. REV. 1223 
(1989) (arguing that rent control is a legal exercise of the police power).  While these provisions 
can therefore have a significant impact on a homeowner, this Article instead focuses on 
limitations that limit the ability of a homeowner to rent in the first instance, at any price. 
 16. See, e.g., Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 799 A.2d 599, 601 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“This excessive presence of rental tenure throughout the municipality has 
adversely impacted the socio-economic fabric of the community in a variety of areas, including 
the housing market, the commercial real estate market, the municipal tax base, demand for police 
services, incidence of code enforcement violations, and increased presence of children-at-risk 
throughout the local school system.”); Coll. Area Renters & Landlord Ass’n v. City of San Diego, 
50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515, 516, 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (Most of the problem houses are tenant 
occupied and the problems include “parking; regular gathering place for many friends; number of 
people over age of 18 exceed number of bedrooms available; and lack of proper maintenance 
detracts from appearance of the neighborhood.  Associated reported problems included noise, 
litter, property damage and traffic congestion.”). 
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ascribed to renters—overcrowding, short-term horizons, increased traffic, 
limited care of property—can also be attributed to many owners.  As a 
consequence, distinctions (made by cities and communities) between renter 
activity and owner activity appear arbitrary, exclusionary, and often mean 
spirited. 
 
1. Actor: none Minimal or no regulation 
minimal or no regulation of rental 
requirements 
2. Actor: local government Procedural rental requirements 
homeowner must comply with local 
safety regulations in order obtain 
permit to rent housing 
3. Actor: local government Land use approvals 
homeowner may not rent accessory 
unit or obtain special land use 
approval without owner occupancy 
4. Actor: local government Short-term vacation rentals 
homeowner may not engage in short 
term or vacation rentals at all, or they 
are regulated 
5. Actor: local government Substantive rental requirements 
homeowner may not rent unless get 
permit 
6. Actors: local government  Neighborhood self-determination 
 and residents  homeowners may not rent at all or 
without permit 
7. Actors: local government  Development agreement restrictions 
 and developer   homeowner may not rent at all within 
certain time period 
8. Actor: developer Private covenants 
homeowner may not rent at all in 
common interest community 
A. Minimal or No Regulation 
This type of regime includes single-family housing that requires no special 
governmental approval to rent.  This does not mean, however, that rental 
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decisions are free from all governmental or private oversight.  For example, 
many zoning ordinances contain a definition of “family” that governs the 
applicable residential zoning district.17  This definition may ostensibly regulate 
how many people can occupy a house in order to preserve residential 
neighborhood values,18 but the zoning definition will likely face increased 
judicial scrutiny if it impinges on Fair Housing protections,19 or the living 
arrangements of a “non-traditional” family.20  Furthermore, a regulation that 
distinguishes between owner-occupied and rented housing in restricting the 
allowable number of residents will likely be similarly scrutinized.21
Private restrictive covenants may also burden individual houses.
 
22  These 
covenants often impose maintenance and other obligations that either the 
tenant or the owner may actually perform, although responsibility for their 
performance ultimately lies with the owner.  For example, a covenant might 
require that the exterior of the house be maintained, landscaping be kept neatly 
trimmed, and outdoor sign displays be limited.23
 
 17. See, e.g., GAINESVILLE, FL., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 30-23, 30-51 (1990), available at 
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10819&sid=9. For a comprehensive 
examination of family definitions in residential zoning districts, see Adam Lubow, “…Not 
Related by Blood, Marriage, of Adoption”: A History of the Definition of “Family”  in Zoning 
Law, 16 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 144 (2007). 
  In short, communities within 
this default category are not free from property regulation generally.  Instead, 
they are only free from property regulations focused on rental housing. 
 18. In Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld a 
zoning ordinance designed to limit the numbers of college students in a residential neighborhood.  
The Court approved the zoning practice of preserving “[a] quiet place where yards are wide, 
people few, and motor vehicles restricted” as “legitimate guidelines in a land-use project 
addressed to family needs.”  Id. at 9 
 19. See City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, 514 U.S. 725, 735 (1995) (holding that 
maximum occupancy restrictions based on housing size are permissible, but that the city’s 
proffered maximum occupancy restriction was really a family composition rule and could be 
challenged under the Fair Housing Act). 
 20. In Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977), the Supreme Court struck 
down a zoning ordinance that would prevent many extended families from living in the same 
house.  The court noted that “[t]he tradition of uncles and aunts, cousins, and especially 
grandparents sharing a household along with parents and children has roots equally venerable [to 
the nuclear family] and equally deserving of constitutional protection.”  Id. at 504. 
 21. See Coll. Area Renters & Landlord Ass’n v. City of San Diego, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515, 
516, 520 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (invalidating an ordinance that limited the number of adult 
occupants in a rented home). 
 22. For a discussion of substantive restrictions imposed by covenants, see infra Part II.H. 
 23. See, e.g., Paula A. Franzese, Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest 
Communities and the Rise of Government for “ the Nice” , 37 URB. L. 335, 335–37 (2005) (noting 
the popularity of common interest communities and their frequent reliance on restrictive 
covenants). 
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B. Procedural Rental Requirements 
Jurisdictions in this category are often desirable vacation destinations or 
located near a college or university.  In response to the disproportionately large 
number of renters in these areas, long-term residents often demand more 
accountability from landlords who lease property to tourists or university 
students,24
In response to this pressure, jurisdictions with procedural rental 
requirements impose some obligations on landlords, including requirements 
that the landlord register with the city, obtain certification of building code 
compliance, and provide tenants with a copy of state and local leasing laws.
 and these jurisdictions often face political and social pressure to 
address rental housing issues more aggressively. 
25  
Registration requirements on landlords are often accompanied by substantive 
obligations to respond promptly to problems with the rental house along with 
penalties for failing to do so.26
Generally, jurisdictions in this category impose leasing requirements on 
individual landlords to mitigate the perceived adverse effects of a high 
concentration of renters.  It is possible, however, that a jurisdiction could deny 
approvals of rental licenses altogether pursuant to a broad leasing 
moratorium.
 
27
 
 24. See, e.g., Jack S. Frierson, Note, How are Local Governments Responding to Student 
Rental Problems in University Towns in the United States, Canada, and England?, 33 GA. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 499, 515–18 (2005) (discussing Gainesville, Florida Definition of Family 
Ordinance and its Landlord Permit Ordinance). 
  But generally, communities employ procedural rental 
requirements to ensure that landlords maintain their rental properties and that 
renters are well-behaved.  Landlords face restrictions on the operation of their 
rental, but not on the decision to rent itself. 
 25. See Palmieri v. Town of Babylon, No. 01CV1399(SJ), 2006 WL 1155162 at *1 
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2006), aff’d, 277 Fed. App’x. 72 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding a city Rental Permit 
Law “requir[ing] that an owner seeking to obtain a rental permit apply in writing to the Town’s 
Building Inspector and provide certification that the subject Property complies ‘with all the 
provisions of the Code of the Town of Babylon, the laws and sanitary and housing regulations of 
the County of Suffolk and the Laws of the State of New York.’”); MIAMI GARDENS, FL., 
ORDINANCE 2005-14-5-52 (2005) (obligating landlord to provide tenant with state and city 
landlord tenant laws and obtain a certificate of occupancy based on compliance with local 
building code regulations). 
 26. GAINESVILLE, FL., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 14.5-2(e) (2003), available at 
http://www.municode.com/resources/gateway.asp?pid=10819&sid=9 (providing a point system 
for landlord violations of city provisions). 
 27. See Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough of Paulsboro, 799 A.2d 599, 608 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2002) (finding that a borough did not have the authority to impose a leasing 
moratorium). 
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C. Land Use Approvals 
Cities may condition land use activity on owner occupancy in two types of 
scenarios.  The first occurs when cities require owner occupancy of all or part 
of a house in order to rent an accessory apartment.28  The second occurs when 
cities require owner occupancy of a house as a condition of a special land use 
approval, such as approval of a variance, conditional use permit, or special 
exception.29  Each of these scenarios face potential judicial scrutiny because 
they challenge the land use maxim that zoning provisions must regulate the use 
of property rather than the user of property.30
Typically, when a city conditions the rental of a house on owner-
occupancy, a homeowner will live in the primary residence and rent a guest 
house or garage.
  If the owner occupancy 
requirement restricts a large number of houses and is substantially related to a 
valid land use policy, the restriction may be upheld.  On the other hand, those 
restrictions that impact a single residence are especially vulnerable to 
challenges. 
31
In Kasper v. Brookhaven, New York homeowners who wished to rent an 
accessory apartment were required to occupy the primary home themselves.
  It is also possible, but less likely, that the owner will 
occupy the guest house or smaller residence, and rent the main house.  States 
vary in their responses to challenges to these restrictions.  New York and Utah 
have upheld owner occupancy restrictions, while North Carolina has ruled 
against them. 
32
 
 28. See discussion infra this section. 
  
The purpose of the ordinance was 
 29. See discussion infra this section. 
 30. Compare Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 393 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1992) (“In general, zoning ordinances are much less suspect when they focus on the use than 
when they command inquiry into who are the users.  The Ordinance here does just that.  It 
prohibits the transient commercial use of residential property for remuneration in the R-1 
District—regardless of who the parties are.”) and Coll. Area Renters & Landlord Ass’n v. City of 
San Diego, 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 515, 521 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (striking an ordinance that limited the 
number of adult occupants in rental housing but not in owner occupied housing.  “In general, 
zoning ordinances are much less suspect when they focus on the use than when they command 
inquiry into who are the users.” (quoting City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 610 P.2d 436, 441–
42 (Cal. 1980)), with Gangemi v. Zoning Board of Appeals of Town of Fairfield, 763 A.2d 1011, 
1022 (Conn. 2001) (Sullivan, J., dissenting) (dissent arguing that the general trend in many 
jurisdictions has leaned away from a strict adherence to the use/user distinction). 
 31. Affordable housing pressures also lead jurisdictions to pass accessory housing 
ordinances.  See, e.g., Paul J. Weinberg & Nola McGuire, “Granny Flats”  and Second Unit 
Housing: Who Speaks for the Neighborhood?, 23 ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 25 (2000) (discussing 
California affordable housing legislation permitting accessory housing in local communities). 
 32. Kasper v. Town of Brookhaven, 535 N.Y.S.2d 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988).  See also 
Sounhein v. City of San Dimas, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (upholding an owner 
occupancy condition on the approval of an accessory apartment). 
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[T]o provide the opportunity and encouragement for the development of small 
rental housing units designed, in particular, to meet the special housing needs 
of single persons and couples of low and moderate income, both young and 
old, and of relatives of families presently living in the Town of Brookhaven.  
Furthermore, it is the purpose and intent of this local law to allow the more 
efficient use of the town’s existing stock of dwellings to provide economic 
support of present resident families of limited income and to protect and 
preserve property values.33
The Kasper court minimized the distinction between regulating the use and 
user by noting that zoning regulations often—and permissibly—regulate both.  
For example, a retirement community district could be created to enable 
nonprofits to accommodate the needs of the elderly.  This type of district 
necessarily focuses on the user—the elderly—rather than the use of the 
property.
 
34  The Kasper court concluded that the Town of Brookhaven “has 
appropriately considered, inter alia, the economic plight of occupying 
homeowners and the obvious benefits which will accrue to the community as a 
whole in enacting the accessory-apartments law.”35
In Anderson v Provo City Corp, the Utah Supreme Court upheld a city 
ordinance permitting only owner-occupiers to rent accessory apartments in a 
neighborhood near Brigham Young University.
 
36  The Provo City Planning 
Commission staff recommended approval of the ordinance and noted that 
residents felt “‘that the[ir] stability is disintegrating one home at a time from 
what was once a predominantly affordable family owner occupied 
neighborhood.’  The proposed amendment was thus intended to ‘prohibit 
outside investors from targeting these neighborhoods[,] buying up homes and 
essentially creating duplexes that do not contribute to overall stability of the 
neighborhood.”37  The Provo ordinance exempted owners from the owner 
occupancy requirement in two instances—medical reasons and defined leaves 
of absences.  The ordinance did not apply if “[t]he owner is placed in a 
hospital, nursing home, assisted living facility or other similar facility,”38 or if 
an “owner has a bona fide, temporary absence of three (3) years or less for 
[certain] activities.”39
In both Kasper and Anderson, local conditions, such as the opportunity to 
earn extra income through renting, or balancing the long-term and short-term 
 
 
 33. Kasper, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 622. 
 34. Id. at 626–27 (citing the example of Maldini v. Ambro, 330 N.E.2d 403 (N.Y. 1975)). 
 35. Kasper, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 627. 
 36. Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 108 P.3d 701 (Utah 2005). 
 37. Id. at 704. 
 38. Id. at 705. 
 39. Id.  Presumably, the three year or less absence would permit individuals to leave for a 
service mission under the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.  Id. at 709.  Utah has a 
significant Mormon religious community. 
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shelter needs of a college town, were found to support the use of rental 
restrictions.  In both instances, non owner-occupier landlords were included in 
the prohibition because these landlords did not have the requisite long-term 
economic and social ties to the surrounding community.  However, the 
exceptions in the Provo ordinance suggest that potentially over-inclusive or 
politically sensitive rental restrictions can be fine tuned to the needs of a 
particular community. 
North Carolina took a different approach in City of Wilmington v. Hill,40 
when the Court of Appeals found unconstitutional a local ordinance that 
required owner occupancy of the primary residence as a condition of renting a 
garage apartment.41  Because garage apartments were allowable uses within 
the particular zoning district, the court reasoned that the local ordinance 
impermissibly regulated the user of the apartment rather than the structure’s 
use as an apartment.42  The ruling in this case was in accord with the general 
principle in North Carolina that it is “beyond the power of the municipality to 
regulate the manner of ownership of the legal estate.”43
In support of its ruling, the City of Wilmington court cited a decision of the 
New Jersey Superior Court affirming the similarities between rental and 
owner-occupied housing:
 
44
Defendants do not even suggest, nor do we believe they properly could, that 
owner-occupation of a dwelling is a different use of the property in a zoning 
sense from tenant-occupation, the actual occupancy of the residence in either 
case being by a single family . . . As indicated, we do not regard a mere change 
from tenant occupancy to owner occupancy as an extension or alteration of the 
previous non-conforming use of the dwellings.
 
45
This approach exemplifies the reluctance of some courts to uphold zoning 
distinctions between renters and homeowner occupiers.  It reflects the view 
that similarly situated people—in this case families in a single family district—
should be treated equally.  The challenge for an anti-speculation rental 
restriction, then, is to deflect perceptions that it would impermissibly 
distinguish between renters and owner-occupiers.  A starting point for such a 
rental restriction would be to focus on its anti-speculator purpose rather than 
perceived, anti-renter effects. 
 
 
 40. 657 S.E.2d 670 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008). 
 41. Id. at 673 (concluding that if the owner wanted to rent the house, the owner would have 
to live in the garage apartment). 
 42. Id. at 672. 
 43. Graham Court Assoc. v. Town Council of Chapel Hill, 281 S.E.2d 418, 422–23 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1981). 
 44. Beers v. Bd. of Adjust. of Twp. of Wayne, 183 A.2d 130 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1962). 
 45. Id. at 136. 
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Cities can also require owner occupancy of the house as a condition of a 
special land use approval. Gangemi v. Zoning Bd. Of Appeals of Town of 
Fairfield46 offers an illustration.  In Gangemi, owners of a residential beach 
property obtained a variance from setback requirements that allowed them to 
enlarge their house and convert the house from summer to year-round use; the 
grant of the variance was subject to a condition that the property would not be 
used for rental purposes.47
Invalidating the owner occupancy restriction, the court noted the 
substantial economic impact faced by property owners who could not rent their 
home.  “Owners of a single-family residence can do one of three economically 
productive things . . . : (1) live in it; (2) rent it; or (3) sell it . . . .  Stripping the 
plaintiffs of essentially one-third of their bundle of economically productive 
rights constituting ownership is a very significant restriction on their right of 
ownership.”
 
48  It would cause “gross[]” unfairness to the owners stemming 
from the significantly reduced resale value of their home compared to the 
values of nearby homes unencumbered by a similar rental restriction.49
The court in Gangemi objected to the patent unfairness of singling out one 
house among many similarly situated houses by imposing an owner occupancy 
restriction.  Such a restriction places a financial and practical burden on an 
isolated homeowner that is not shared with similar homeowners in the 
community.  The court recognized the significance of this disparate treatment 
and cited an example where a different rule might be appropriate: 
 
It may be that where such a condition is imposed by virtue of a statute or 
regulation that is of district-wide application and is tailored to a specific land 
use policy . . . such a condition might be valid.  Where, however, as in the 
present case, the no rental condition is not district-wide and therefore 
presumably applies only to the property at issue, thereby affording the other 
property owners in the beach district a distinct market advantage, and there is 
no other regulation even approaching is scope or purpose, the continued 
maintenance of the no rental condition serves no valid purpose, and violates 
 
 46. 763 A.2d 1011 (Conn. 2001). 
 47. Id.  The property owners did not object to this condition until ten years after the variance 
was granted.  Despite their failure to object to the original condition, the court allowed the 
property owners to proceed with their challenge in light of the importance of the public policy 
issue at hand.  Id. at 1015.  However, not every court is so forgiving of a property owner’s failure 
to make a timely objection.  In Kulak v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Bristol Twp., 563 A.2d 978 (Pa. 
Comm. Ct. 1989), the court did not allow a subsequent owner to contest an owner occupancy 
restriction imposed without challenge by a previous owner even though the reviewing court 
disagreed with the validity of the owner occupancy provision. 
 48. Gangemi, 763 A.2d at 1015–16. 
 49. Id. at 1016. 
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the strong and deeply rooted public policy in favor of the free and unrestricted 
alienability of property.50
D. Short-term Vacation Rentals 
 
Communities that are also tourist destinations often face a high demand for 
short-term vacation rentals.  In these communities, landlords typically rent 
single-family homes for a short period of time, such as one or two weeks, 
rather than for six months or a year.  These short-term rentals can cause 
considerable friction in single-family residential neighborhoods.  Long-term 
residents—both renters and owner-occupiers—complain of the increased 
traffic, noise, and sporadic upkeep associated with short-term rentals.  In 
response, some communities have banned short-term rentals through privately-
enforced restrictive covenants.51  Other communities have sought to limit 
short-term rentals through municipal action.52
Sedona, Arizona, a picturesque town north of Phoenix, is an example of 
such a community.  Sedona has long had a short-term rental ordinance (defined 
as a rental for less than 30 days) on its books, but the ordinance was seldomly 
enforced.  Buoyed by increased advertising on the internet, short-term rentals 
in the area grew rapidly and led the city council to revisit the ordinance in 
2008.  The council voted to keep the ordinance, add penalties against 
advertisers of these rentals, and raise the penalty for noncompliance from $250 
to $2500.
 
53  In support of its decision, the council noted Sedona’s “small-town 
character, scenic beauty and natural resources” and concluded that an 
ordinance prohibiting short-term rentals was necessary “to safeguard the peace, 
safety and general welfare of the residents of Sedona . . . by eliminating noise, 
vandalism, overcrowding, neighborhood uncertainty, high occupant turnover, 
diminution of neighborhood character, and other secondary effects [of short-
term rentals].”54
Short-term rental restrictions like Sedona’s typically aim to protect the 
aesthetic tranquility and quality of life of neighborhoods.  The impact of these 
restrictions on homeowners who wish to rent, however, can be quite 
significant.  In many cases, the regulations affect the second homes of owners 
in vacation areas who may wish to rent the properties when they are not using 
 
 
 50. Id. at 1018.  The Gangemi Court cited Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal. 
Rptr. 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) as an example of a district wide application.  In Ewing, the Court 
upheld a community wide ban on short term rentals. 
 51. See, e.g., Mission Shores Ass’n v. Pheil, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 108, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) 
(finding a prohibition on short term rentals in CC & Rs reasonable and discussing its 
commonality in common interest communities). 
 52. See, e.g., SAN BUENAVENTURA, CAL., ORDINANCE CODE § 6.455 (2009) (requiring an 
application, surety bond, and a nuisance response plan). 
 53. SEDONA, ARIZ., ORDINANCE §§ 8-4-1–8-4-6 (2008). 
 54. § 8-4-2. 
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them.  While these short-term restrictions may not appear severe at first glance, 
the lost rental income can be significant, and the usefulness of the house as a 
primary dwelling is often limited due to the owner’s other homes. 
Jurisdictions that enact short-term rental restrictions through their zoning 
powers can face significant hurdles.  While courts may be sympathetic to the 
problems that neighbors and municipalities face with short-term rentals, they 
are often troubled by these atypical expressions of zoning power or the effect 
of restrictions on individual property owners.  As one New Jersey court 
explained, “[z]oning laws are designed to control types of uses in particular 
zones and are not ordinarily concerned with periods of occupancy or the 
property interest of the occupants.”55
Courts often deem the effects of short-term rental bans on the rights of 
private property ownership too extreme and over-inclusive.  For example, a 
long-time resident who wants to travel abroad for a summer cannot make a 
limited rental of her home; a long-time owner who uses the home as a summer 
residence cannot rent the home for other portions of the year; and an executor 
of an estate cannot make a short-term rental of the deceased’s home while 
settling the estate.
 
56
When courts do uphold short-term rental bans, they typically emphasize 
the connection between the zoning provision and the city’s comprehensive 
planning goals, the other uses the property owner could make of the property, 
and the rational relationship between the ban and the goal of residential 
stability.
  In striking down these zoning regulations, courts have 
encouraged municipalities to use other measures—such as definitions of family 
or increased enforcement of nuisance codes—to mitigate the impact of 
potentially disruptive, short-term renters on a community. 
57  In Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, the court compared the 
threat posed by short-term rentals to the residential character of the community 
with the goal of zoning ordinance banning short term rentals.58  Rather than 
focus on the empirical dispute about whether short-term renters adversely 
impacted communities more than homeowners or long-term tenants, the court 
instead concluded that short-term tenants do not engage in community-
strengthening activities.59
Thus, short-term rental ordinances appear to succeed or fail depending on 
how a court balances the extent of the property interest impaired with the goal 
  Therefore, a rational relationship existed between 
the ban and the goal of protecting residential character. 
 
 55. United Prop. Owners Ass’n of Belmar v. Borough of Belmar, 447 A.2d 933, 936 (N.J. 
1982) (striking down a zoning regulation prohibiting the temporary or seasonal rental of 
residential property in most residential districts). 
 56. Id. at 936–37. 
 57. See, e.g., Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal.Rptr. 382 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) 
 58. Id. at 385. 
 59. Id. at 388. 
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of the government regulation.  In finding for the government, a court may 
characterize the ordinance as a relatively minor intrusion on alienation rights; 
the goal of such an ordinance—protecting residential neighborhood values—is 
long-held and particularly vulnerable in tourist communities where hotels and 
similar establishments traditionally engage in short-term rentals.  In finding for 
the homeowner, the court may view the ordinance as one that has a disparate 
impact on an individual member of the community, far-reaching economic 
consequences for the property, or an unintended over-inclusive effect. 
E. Substantive Rental Requirements 
St. Bernard Parish is a municipality southeast of New Orleans that is in the 
process of rebuilding after being severely damaged during hurricane Katrina in 
2005.  The population of the Parish was 66,000 before the flood; in 2009 that 
number stood at just over 33,000.60  In 2006, the Parish Council enacted an 
ordinance to regulate single-family rental housing, with the goal of 
“encourage[ing] single family residence owners to return, rebuild, and resume 
living in the parish and to reoccupy their homes . . . to maintain the integrity 
and stability of established neighborhoods . . .” and “to foster and encourage a 
community and family atmosphere in the neighborhoods of St. Bernard 
Parish.”  (Ordinance 12–06.)61  Under the terms of the ordinance, “No person 
or entity shall rent, or lease, directly or indirectly, any single-family residence 
located in an R-1 zone, without first obtaining a Permissive Use Permit from 
the St. Bernard Parish Council.”62
In St. Bernard Parish, the restriction on alienation was enacted in the wake 
of a tremendous natural disaster.  While the cause of the destruction and 
subsequent construction of new homes in the parish is exceptional, the 
phenomenon of a community undergoing population growth and, 
consequently, construction of a large number of new homes, is much more 
commonplace. 
 
The St. Bernard ordinance requires landlords to obtain a permit from the 
city planning department before renting a property.  In contrast to the permits 
or code requirements noted in the procedural rental requirements category,63
 
 60. U.S. Census Bureau, St. Bernard Parish QuickFacts (2009), http://quickfacts.census.gov/ 
qfd/states/22/22087.html (last visited Feb. 6, 2010). 
 
these permit requirements contain many more substantive elements and focus 
 61. Baker v. St. Bernard Parish Council, No. 08-1303, 2008 WL 4681373, at *1 (E.D. La. 
Oct. 21, 2008). 
 62. Id. at *2.  Although the Parish Council ultimately determines whether a permit will be 
granted, an individual must first submit an application (along with a $250 filing fee) to the 
planning department who reviews the application and submits a recommendation to the Parish 
Council.  Id. 
 63. See supra Part II.B. 
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on the larger community, as well as the physical condition of the particular 
home for rent.  The approval process includes an analysis of the following 
criteria: 
1. The history of any properties within a one thousand (1,000) foot radius 
being used as rental properties. 
2. The volume of rental properties shall not exceed 2 R1 Permissive Use 
Permit rental properties within five hundred (500) linear frontage feet of 
contiguous R1 dwellings. 
3. The availability of R1 homes used as rental properties within the boundaries 
of St. Bernard Parish at the time of the request. 
4. The level of compliance exhibited by the property owner in maintaining 
other rental properties within St. Bernard Parish.64
The text of the St. Bernard ordinance does not address speculation, but it 
does mention the “integrity and stability of established neighborhoods” and its 
hope that residents will “return, rebuild, and resume living” in the parish.
 
65  
While these express substantive requirements could encourage the exclusion of 
politically and economically vulnerable communities,66
F. Neighborhood Self-determination 
 they could also have 
the effect of excluding speculators and similar purchasers with short-term 
outlooks, an outcome the Parish seems to be promoting. 
The city of East Lansing, Michigan allows communities to petition the city 
council to establish rental restrictions through a residential rental restriction 
overlay district.67  The ordinance enables residents “to preserve the 
attractiveness, desirability, and privacy of residential neighborhoods by 
precluding all or certain types of rental properties and thereby preclude the 
deleterious effects rental properties can have on a neighborhood with regard to 
property deterioration, increased density, congestion, noise and traffic levels 
and reduction of property values.”68
 
 64. Id. 
  A community must obtain the signatures 
 65. Id. at *1. 
 66. The ordinances in St. Bernard Parish have been challenged by a fair housing agency.  
Press Release, Greater New Orleans Fair Housing Action Center, Fair Housing Center Files Suit 
Against St. Bernard Parish (Oct. 3, 2006), http://gnofairhousing.org/10-03-06-StBernardsuit.htm 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2009).  St. Bernard Parish officials have also objected to the construction of 
multifamily rental apartments in the community.  See Campbell Robertson, A Battle Over Low-
Income Housing Reveals Post-Hurricane Tensions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2009, at A16. 
 67. EAST LANSING, MICH., CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 50–772–776 (2003). 
 68. § 50-773.  The ordinance also contains these additional objectives: (1) To protect the 
privacy of residents and to minimize noise, congestion, and nuisance impacts by regulating the 
types of rental properties (2) To maintain an attractive community appearance and to provide a 
PINDELL_ARTICLE.DOCX   
58 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:41 
of two-thirds of the property owners in the community to qualify for the 
overlay district.69  Communities can prohibit new rentals altogether, or restrict 
rental licenses to owner-occupiers who wish to allow a renter to share the 
house.  According to the city’s website, thirteen neighborhoods have obtained 
overlay district designations restricting rentals in this way.70
A benefit of this type of regulation is the ability of neighborhoods to 
determine for themselves whether they will enact restrictions.  Community 
members are able to participate meaningfully in decisions at the neighborhood 
level, and local officials can mediate disagreements among contentious 
neighbors or use their discretionary power to deny or modify some requests. 
 
It is interesting to consider the types of neighborhoods that would take 
advantage of an overlay opportunity.  The obvious candidates are relatively 
affluent neighborhoods with residents who want to maintain a high quality of 
life.  An overlay ordinance could also be useful, however, to less affluent 
neighborhoods that are vulnerable to changes in stability and quality of life.  
Consider, for example, a neighborhood of long-time homeowners in a 
declining urban area.  Residents in this neighborhood may fear displacement 
by gentrification, or instead, may fear the gradual encroachment of poorer 
residents and poorly maintained houses from nearby communities.  A zoning 
overlay district preventing rentals, and thereby discouraging speculation and 
absentee owners, might be desirable for this type of neighborhood as well.71
G. Development Agreement Restrictions 
 
This type of restriction begins to transition from a public regulation 
enforceable by governmental actors to a private agreement enforceable by 
private actors.  For example, a local government and a developer may agree to 
limit rentals in a new planned community of single-family homes.  A 
development agreement—a contract between the two parties—would reflect 
the restriction.72
 
desirable living environment for residents by preserving the owner occupied character of the 
neighborhood (3) To prevent excessive traffic and parking problems in the neighborhoods.  Id. 
  Unlike a public ordinance enforceable by the city, a 
 69. § 50-775 (1)(c). 
 70. See City of East Lansing, Rental Restriction Overlays Passed by City Council, 
http://www.cityofeastlansing.com/Home/Departments/CodeEnforcement/RentalHousingInformati
on/ResidentialRentalRestrictionOverlayDistrict/ (last visited October 20, 2009). 
 71. Robert Nelson argues that established neighborhoods could benefit from the restrictive 
covenant communities and private neighborhood associations that frequently appear in new 
communities and proposes a statutory scheme to create this possibility.  See ROBERT H. NELSON, 
PRIVATE NEIGHBORHOODS AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 265–270 
(2005). 
 72. See generally DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT: A 
HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, LAND 
DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES 91–
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development agreement imposing a rental restriction is typically enforceable 
by the developer. 
Development agreements can be useful land use planning tools that govern 
virtually all aspects of a new community—from providing alternatives to rigid, 
prevailing zoning standards, to outlining the financial and in-kind contributions 
a developer agrees to make to the community in exchange for land use 
approvals by the local government.  As a result of these trade-offs, 
development agreements provide benefits to both local governments and 
developers.  Local governments can extract more financial and in-kind 
contributions from developers than they would in a standard land use approval 
process.73  Developers, in turn, can design a community without conforming to 
standardized requirements ill-suited to a planned community.  Moreover, 
future residents of these communities benefit because negotiation often results 
in more thoughtful inclusion and placement of amenities than does the 
application of a rigid standardized zoning and development code.74
One example of this kind of requirement is the development agreement 
provision in a yet-to-be developed housing community in North Las Vegas, 
Nevada.  At the time the city council adopted the requirement, North Las 
Vegas was experiencing unprecedented population growth and the city council 
sought to manage the effects of this growth on neighborhoods and residents.  
The applicable provision states: 
 
(f) Leasing Restriction.  The Developer agrees, and shall require of all 
Builders, to include in all contracts for the sale of Dwelling Units other than 
Custom, Semi-Custom, Executive and Upgrade, a section prohibiting the 
leasing of the Dwelling Unit for twenty-four (24) months.  Developer shall 
submit the proposed language to the City Manager for review and approval 
which shall be considered approved if the City Manager does not respond with 
 
115 (2003); Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, 
Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 
N.C. L. REV. 957 (1987). 
 73. Exactions law limits the ability of the government to demand broad concessions from 
landowners as a condition of a particular land use approval to those that are reasonably connected 
and proportional to the anticipated adverse public effects of a proposed development.  Nollan v. 
California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 836–37 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 
390–91 (1994). 
 74. A challenge for future residents of the community as well as existing residents of 
surrounding communities is achieving meaningful participation in the development agreement 
process.  See Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model 
for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, 
Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2005); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the 
Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and 
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions, Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269 (2005); 
Ngai Pindell, Developing Las Vegas: Creating Inclusionary Affordable Housing Requirements in 
Development Agreements, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419 (2007). 
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thirty (30) days.  The language shall include an assignment by the seller of the 
seller’s right to enforce the prohibition after closing.75
In comparison to other cities in the Las Vegas valley, North Las Vegas has 
historically housed an unequal proportion of apartment houses and single-
family homes.  As the Las Vegas valley boomed in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, surrounding areas like the City of Henderson and the City of Las Vegas 
grew more affluent by adding relatively high-end, master-planned 
communities.  North Las Vegas wanted to share in that growth, as well as limit 
the harms that speculators and absentee owners brought to new communities. 
 
Recently, North Las Vegas, like other cities in Nevada and across the 
nation, has been ravaged by unprecedented numbers of home foreclosures and 
a corresponding plummet in housing prices.  The city would likely be pleased 
if any purchaser—speculator or not—purchased housing in the area.  It 
remains to be seen whether North Las Vegas will keep the rental restrictions in 
place once the community is built. 
H. Private Covenants 
Algy and Edna McGlothin owned a home in a subdivision burdened by 
private covenants.76  One of the covenants required that an owner or immediate 
family member reside in the home and prohibited homeowners from renting 
their houses to tenants.77  The McGlothins lived together in the home until 
Mrs. McGlothin fell and broke her hip in 1998, after which she moved into a 
nursing home.  Five months later, Mr. McGlothin also moved to the nursing 
home.  Mr. McGlothin died in the summer of 1999, and their daughter began 
leasing the home to others to help defray the costs of Mrs. McGlothin’s 
nursing home care.78
The conflict was simple: when the McGlothins leased their home, the 
homeowners association sued to enforce the covenant.
 
79
 
 75. Development Agreement,The City of North Las Vegas-November 2005 Land Investors, 
L.L.C./DRHI, Inc., May 3, 2006, at 16 (emphasis added). 
  The McGlothins did 
not violate the covenants because they believed in the free alienation of 
 76. Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 
1277 (Ind. 2008).  See also discussion of minimal requirements, supra Part II.A. 
 77. Villas West II, 885 N.E. 2d at 1277.  The covenant read: “Lease of Dwelling by Owner.  
For the purpose of maintaining the congenial and residential character of Villas West II and for 
the protection of the Owners with regard to financially responsible residents, lease of a Dwelling 
by an Owner, [sic] shall not be allowed.  Each Dwelling shall be occupied by an Owner and their 
immediate family.”  Id.  Some of these same restrictions exist in condominium units, especially 
those providing affordable housing.  See City of Oceanside v. McKenna, 264 Cal. Rptr. 275 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1989) (upholding reasonableness of owner occupancy and no rental provision in a 
condominium). 
 78. Villas West II, 885 N.E.2d at 1277–78. 
 79. Id. at 1278. 
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property or because they were rebelling against overly restrictive covenants.  
Instead, their story reflected the ordinary, and often adverse, twists and turns of 
families everywhere.  The McGlothins objection to the no-rental provision 
arose from a simple need for income.  They needed the rental income the house 
produced to make their lives work.80
The court found the no-rental covenant enforceable, noting the frequency 
and utility of covenant provisions across the country.
 
81
III.  EVALUATION AND CRITIQUE 
  The McGlothin’s story 
illustrates the danger of rental restrictions imposed by restrictive covenants: 
they have the potential to increase economic instability for lower-income 
families, depriving them of rental income from their homes when a sale of the 
home is impracticable or impossible.  The McGlothin’s were not able to use 
their property to generate income for medical expenses.  The overinclusiveness 
of this type of rental provision lies in its permanency and lack of provision for 
exceptions.  If a municipality adopted this type of restriction, however, it could 
be limited to a fixed period of time, like two or three years, thus reducing its 
potential for overinclusivity. 
Part II of this article described examples of rental restrictions used by 
communities across the country.  What those restrictions have in common is 
the struggle to strike a balance between individual property ownership and 
community concerns.  Ideally, rental limitations enhance the interests of both 
the community and the individual.  These restrictions help stabilize 
communities threatened by short-term disruptive activities that could otherwise 
lead to long-term destabilization, and individual property owners often derive 
personal and economic value from the imposition of restrictions in their 
communities.  The rental restrictions described in Part II are often used for 
purposes that bear some similarity to the goals of anti-speculation legislation.  
What do these examples suggest, then, for using rental restrictions to combat 
speculation? 
The first two categories of restrictions—minimal restrictions and 
procedural requirements—generally reflect the normal slate of local land use 
regulations on home ownership.  At the edges, jurisdictions may escalate these 
garden-variety restrictions so they have a substantive effect,82
 
 80. Id. 
 but this 
escalation appears to be the exception rather than the rule.  At their normal 
level of enforcement, these types of minimal restrictions could be used to 
monitor speculative activity in a neighborhood, but they would not likely alter 
any speculative behavior because they can be easily satisfied. 
 81. Id. at 1278–79. 
 82. See discussion of Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough, supra note 16, and Part II.B. 
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The land use approval examples illustrate local governments’ concern 
about the effects of owner-occupied and rental housing on community 
character, but the scope of these regulations is often narrow and typically 
applies to individual homeowners.  Those provisions that do apply to entire 
communities, such as accessory use ordinances, reflect the conflict between 
regulating the use versus the user of property.  As shown by the variety of 
approaches, this conflict remains unresolved.  The lesson for an anti-
speculation measure is that a broadly applied ordinance will be more likely to 
withstand judicial scrutiny than a measure that applies to an individual 
homeowner. 
Short-term and substantive rental requirements raise issues similar to those 
that would be raised by speculation ordinances.  Jurisdictions in both 
categories distinguish between owner-occupied and rental housing, and 
prohibit rental housing using brightline or substantive rules, often with over-
inclusive consequences.  Because of this potentially harsh result, a system that 
includes local government discretion to allow rentals may fare better than one 
without such exceptions.  The St. Bernard Parish ordinance, outlined in Part 
III.E, survived a facial challenge largely because of this type of local 
discretion. 
The remaining types of rental restrictions each have a significant private 
enforcement component that seems to mitigate their legal vulnerability.  In the 
self-determination category, neighborhood residents can request that the local 
government impose rental restrictions.  Although the local government 
enforces violations, the fundamentals of this system are similar to a community 
burdened by mutually restrictive covenants where owners are able to opt in to a 
more regulated ownership structure.  Private covenants still trigger an 
exclusionary zoning analysis, but the rental restriction itself is viewed as a 
common feature of restrictive covenant communities, rather than an 
exceptional limitation on an owner’s right of alienation.  Finally, restrictions in 
development agreements allow local governments to impose public values 
through private enforcement, thereby avoiding the legal challenges faced by 
jurisdictions under other schemes.83
 
 83. New and growing communities, like North Las Vegas, Nevada, offer a chance to explore 
property relationships that would pose more difficult political and economic challenges in 
established neighborhoods.  This same possibility may exist in a city like New Orleans that has 
been ravaged by natural disaster.  See generally John A. Lovett, Property and Radically Changed 
Circumstances, 74 TENN. L. REV. 463 (2007) (exploring how Hurricane Katrina altered how 
lawmakers and theorists view property); Joseph William Singer, After the Flood: Equality & 
Humanity in Property Regimes, 52 LOY. L. REV. 243 (2006) (exploring the nature of poverty and 
property in the context of Post-Hurricane Katrina New Orleans). 
  Any of these three types of rental 
restrictions could accommodate an anti-speculation focus if the affected 
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community wished.  Each also involves a private element that could mitigate 
political opposition to anti-speculation measures. 
The examples in Part III provide a baseline for evaluating an anti-
speculation ordinance restricting rentals.  The following analysis explores the 
policy and legal challenges an anti-speculation ordinance restricting rentals 
might face. 
A. Competing Visions of Housing—Deconstructing Homeownership 
Because the first hurdle for any anti-speculation ordinance is likely to be a 
challenge to prevailing conceptions of property and home ownership, it is 
useful to deconstruct those conceptions before thinking about the propriety of 
“limitations.”  While the investment model of homeownership has enjoyed 
prominence over the last decade of housing price inflation and deflation, anti-
speculation ordinances embody a view of homeownership as the expression of 
many components—and the embodiment of many ideals—and that each of 
these deserves legal protection. 
In addition to its investment value, housing also provides other subjective 
benefits, like its facilitation of family life and identity, its necessity as shelter, 
and its role in preserving social order.84  Private property, and by extension the 
family home, can be seen as a source of freedom and liberty from government 
coercion.85  The home reflects ideals of privacy,86 security,87 identity,88 as well 
as an escape from crowded cities.89
 
 84. Iglesias, supra note 1, at 511. 
  While speculation therefore reflects a 
 85. See generally, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962); Charles A. 
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (For a recent evaluation of the debate, see D. 
Benjamin Barros, Property and Freedom, 4 N.Y.U. J. LAW & LIBERTY 36 (2009)) (evaluating the 
institutional relationship between property and freedom). 
 86. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (declaring a Texas law criminalizing 
same sex intercourse unconstitutional.  The Court stated that “[t]he laws involved . . . here are, to 
be sure, statutes that purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act.  Their penalties 
and purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most private 
human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”  Id. at 567. 
 87. Barros, supra note 1, at 260–269 (discussing security against other individuals and 
security against government intrusion). 
 88. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 1, at 959 (citing a house as an example of property closely 
connected with personhood). 
 89. See, e.g., Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (upholding a “traditional family” 
single family zoning designation and extolling the values of suburban life).  The Court declared 
that “[a] quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles restricted are 
legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to family needs. . . . The [scope of the] 
police power . . . is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of 
quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people.”  Id. 
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view of housing as a market asset to be managed for maximum economic gain, 
it is also important to remember these subjective values.90
In addition to investment value and other subjective values of property, 
homeownership also provides use value.  Unlike the exchange value of 
property, which focuses on property as an investment and assumes that 
consumers manage their investment in rational, profit maximizing ways, use 
value refers generally to those features of property that are not captured solely 
by maximizing economic gain.  For example, home ownership signals to the 
rest of society the maturation, adulthood, and stability of homeowners.
 
91  
Homeowners can transform the interior and exterior spaces of a property to 
suit their lifestyles.92  Homeownership provides access to social goods like 
schools and parks, and creates and reinforces social ties among neighbors.93
Decisionmakers should care about disentangling exchange and use values.  
In a recent article, Eduardo Penalver offers three reasons why theorists should 
be cautious about using an investment or exchange-value-maximization as the 
overarching model: (1) if there are other values that motivate homeowners 
besides maximizing exchange value, a theory that relies solely on exchange 
value will not accurately reflect or predict homeowners decisions; (2) even 
when the exchange value model seems to accurately predict an action, the 
model may not accurately capture the motive for the action; and (3) the 
prevailing conversation about exchange maximization causes homeowner-
actors to believe that this is what is expected of them and then act to fulfill 
those expectations.
  
The mortgage excesses of the last decade illustrate the pitfalls of an 
overemphasis on the exchange values of property, and a corresponding 
underemphasis on homeownership’s other, more subjective, benefits. 
94
While the investment model has enjoyed prominence over the last decade 
of housing price inflation and deflation, rental restrictions reflect the existence 
of and support for other values.  Although rental restrictions can promote the 
investment model by maximizing property values, they also create long-term 
relationships in communities and can promote healthy, stable living 
environments.  Furthermore, rental restrictions imposed by local governments 
 
 
 90. See, e.g., Eduardo Penalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 834 (2009); 
Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings 
Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1656 (2006) (describing homeowners’ subjective and market 
values of their homes). 
 91. Penalver, supra note 90, at 835. 
 92. Id. at 836–37. 
 93. Id. at 838. 
 94. Id. at 840–41. 
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are one component of larger scheme of land use regulation; rather than 
operating independently, these values often coexist.95
B. Speculation and the Efficacy of Municipal Responses 
 
Would an anti-speculation ordinance advance important housing values?  
To answer this question, it is first necessary to describe the harm that 
residential real estate speculation causes local governments and communities, 
and then address the policy and practical challenges to local government 
intervention. 
1. The Effects of Speculation 
Residential real estate speculators have been blamed for much of the 
creation and destruction of the housing bubble across the country.96  The 
primary allegation is that speculative purchasers increase prices rapidly and 
artificially; that is, price increases are not due to any improvement in the 
quality of the housing stock, community amenities, or local jobs, but to the 
perceived demand created by speculative purchases.97
 
 95. Iglesias, supra note 1, at 516–17.  Iglesias argues that “(1) there are five distinct, 
decipherable, and stable housing ethics deeply embedded in American housing policy and law 
that influence current housing law and policy through an ongoing social dialogue; (2) the five 
housing ethics can combine with each other, and they may also conflict and function as reciprocal 
constraints on each other; and (3) while there is a potential for temporary or limited hegemony in 
certain contexts, coexistence and pluralism among the housing ethics is the norm and is likely to 
persist.”  Id. 
  Anti-speculation 
measures, such as rental restrictions, would ideally create more stable 
 96. See Ruth Simon & Michael Corkery, Speculators May Have Accelerated Housing 
Downturn, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2008, at B8 (reporting high numbers of “hidden speculators” and 
corresponding claims of occupancy fraud); Jeff German et al., Speculators Bear Brunt of 
Foreclosures, LAS VEGAS SUN, Sep. 23, 2007 (describing effect of speculation on Las Vegas 
housing market); Patty Shillington, Adjustable Mortgages Out of Favor, MIAMI HERALD, May 
31, 2009 (noting that adjustable rate mortgages were popular among speculators). 
 97. The economist Robert Shiller called the speculative bubble a “social contagion” in which 
everyone believed prices would continue to go up.  ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME 
SOLUTION: HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
44–45 (2008).  See also R. Lisle Baker & Stephen O. Andersen, Taxing Speculative Land Gains: 
The Vermont Experience, 22 URB. L. ANN. 3, 9 (1981): 
Proponents of government intervention to control land speculation . . . argue that 
speculators artificially increase land prices in different (and sometimes inconsistent) 
ways: (1) by withholding some land from resale, awaiting even higher prices; (2) by 
bidding up the prices of land they do not yet own; or (3) by short-term holding of other 
land, fostering an accelerating turnover of properties that amplifies the cost-push inflation 
of significant land transfer expenses.  Arguably, these price increases cause higher tax 
assessments for land-owners reluctant to sell. 
Id. 
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communities by limiting turnover and preventing community decline from 
free-falling home prices caused by the “bursting” of the speculative bubble.98
Speculation on housing differs from speculation on raw land or other 
property assets.  This article defines speculation broadly as purchasing an asset 
primarily—if not solely—for its resale value rather than for its immediate 
use.
 
99  While speculation on vacant land may actually increase efficiencies by 
regulating the pace of development, speculation on existing housing units does 
not achieve the same goals.100
The collapse of the housing market has harmed individual homeowners 
and communities in many ways.  In the exuberance of the last decade, lenders 
and borrowers regularly overreached.
  Because the units have already been built, the 
speculator who purchases these units is merely incentivizing a builder to build 
more units that may not be occupied. 
101  Lenders extended credit at higher and 
higher prices to borrowers who would not be able to pay when interest rates 
and terms reset.  Both borrowers and lenders assumed that as home values 
continued to rise, borrowers could refinance at lower rates and maintain 
payments, at least temporarily, on high-cost mortgages.  When home values 
fell, and the broader economic crisis reduced or eliminated the income of many 
borrowers, homeowners found themselves upside down in their homes and 
unable to service existing loans.102
 
 98. The housing crisis does offer an opportunity to increase the stock of affordable housing.  
In some cities, housing advocates acquire foreclosed houses, make repairs, and resell them to 
owner occupiers.  Speculators are not allowed to purchase the homes.  See Marcelle S. Fischler, 
Affordable Homes, via Foreclosure, N. Y. TIMES, May 3, 2009, at RE7 (describing the work of 
the federally financed Neighborhood Stabilization Program). 
  This problem intensified when the interest 
rates and terms on variable rate loans reset after three or five years.  Unable to 
afford existing loan payments, refinance, or sell their homes for an amount 
 99. Vermont imposes a tax on speculative land purchases.  A study of the program defined 
speculation similarly.  “The Vermont land gains tax . . . deter[s] landowners from transferring (by 
sale or other exchange) land held for a short period of time, where the principal economic return 
realized comes from increased value rather than rental or other income.”  Baker & Andersen, 
supra note 97, at 7. 
 100. See NELSON, supra note 71, at 294 (noting the benefit of speculation on vacant land).  
Cyber-squatting presents an example of speculation that the law currently disfavors.  See Daphna 
Lewinsohn-Zamir, More is Not Always Better Than Less: An Exploration in Property Law, 92 
MINN. L. REV. 634, 694 (2008) (comparing the relative lack of laws prohibiting land speculation 
to more laws regulating the speculative purchases of domain names in cyberspace). 
 101. See generally Ellen Harnick, The Crisis in Housing and Housing Finance: What Caused 
it? What Didn’t? What’s Next?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 625, 625 (2009) (“The problem is not 
simply that people borrowed more than they could repay, but that loans were structured in a way 
that was inherently unstable.”). 
 102. See id. at 628–31 (2009) (describing use of risky loan products). 
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sufficient to pay off the mortgage, these borrowers have been forced to walk 
away from homes, or face short sales, or foreclosures.103
The effect of the housing market crash on individuals is not limited to the 
borrower’s economic situation.  Borrowers who have been foreclosed on often 
suffer from stress, depression, and feelings of failure,
 
104 and their children can 
experience significant educational and social disruption.105  Surrounding 
homeowners can also suffer.  Owners of houses facing foreclosure often 
neglect the maintenance of landscaping and housing exteriors.  Foreclosed 
houses can remain vacant for months or even years, falling into disrepair and 
becoming susceptible to vandalism or other property crimes.  Finally, bank-
owned foreclosed homes resell at a deflated price, lowering the property values 
of surrounding homes.106
Apart from the impact on individual homeowners and neighborhoods, 
cities also suffer in a rapidly declining housing market.
 
107  Cities face falling 
property tax revenue,108 as well as increased administrative costs.109  To 
respond to the increased crime rates surrounding vacant properties, cities must 
increase monitoring of vacant and foreclosed housing, as well as police and 
fire protection.110
Finally, renters of foreclosed housing can be displaced, typically with 
limited legal protections and little notice.
 
111
 
 103. A borrower must ask herself “[s]hould I stay in the home I love, or stick it to the bank?” 
Brian Eckhouse, Whether to Walk Away: Housing’s Moral Minefield, LAS VEGAS SUN, Mar. 22, 
2009, at M1 (describing decision matrix when a borrower owes more on a mortgage than the 
house is worth). 
  With limited exceptions, a 
renter’s interest in a foreclosed property is subordinate to a prior, valid 
 104. Lauren E. Willis, Will the Mortgage Market Correct? How Households and 
Communities Would Fare If Risk Were Priced Well, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1177, 1188–91 (2009). 
 105. Id. at 1191–92. 
 106. See Engel, supra note 9, at 355–60. 
 107. Some cities blame predatory lending for exacerbating the housing crisis and have sued 
lenders directly.  See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law 
and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (2002) (defining predatory 
lending as practices ranging from severely harmful payment structures to fraud).  For more on 
city suits against lenders, see Pindell, supra note 6, at 170, 176–77. 
 108. See, e.g., Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External Costs of Foreclosure: The 
Impact of Single-family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property Values, 17 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 
57, 58 (2006) (noting an average property value decline of $159,000 per foreclosure in Chicago). 
 109. See, e.g., William C. Apgar et al., The Municipal Cost of Foreclosures: A Case Study 1–
2 (Homeownership Preservation Fund, Research Paper No. 2005-1), available at http://neighbor 
works.issuelab.org/research (estimating that each foreclosure in Chicago could increase municipal 
costs by $34,000). 
 110. Relman, supra note 9, at 633–34. 
 111. Vicki Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants: Innocent Victims of the Nation’s 
Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 1, 2–4, 6–7 (2009) (examining effect of foreclosure on 
renters and renter legal protections). 
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mortgage.112  Moreover, renters often do not learn of a foreclosure until a bank 
representative knocks at the door or a “for sale” sign appears in the front 
yard.113  The renter may be current on her lease obligation, but the landlord has 
not used her rent to pay the mortgage and has defaulted.  This scenario has 
encouraged the federal government and some local governments to respond 
with protective tenant legislation,114
The significant impact that residential real estate speculation has on 
homeowners, cities, and renters creates a clear incentive for local governments 
to address speculation.  The next section examines whether they should. 
 but the efficacy of these legislative efforts 
will need to be evaluated over the coming years. 
2. The Wisdom of Municipal Rental Restrictions on Homeowners 
Are local governments effective regulators of residential real estate 
speculation?  An alternative to local government regulation is to create federal 
legislation to respond to lending and borrowing practices that create 
speculation.  Local governments can face resistance when they attempt to 
regulate issues that are perceived to be more national in scope.115  Another 
approach could be to let the private borrowing and lending market sort itself 
out, either through changes to the purchasing attitudes of borrowers in 
response to a national recession, or through changes to the lending industry in 
response to market lessons and incentives; both of these changes perhaps 
supplemented by national or state regulation.  Relying on behavior reforms to 
solve the problem is troubling, however, on both demand and supply sides.  
Individual borrowers will continue to engage in risky behavior by failing to 
account for the existence of a foreclosure risk, or by minimizing the 
foreclosure risk they do perceive.116
 
 112. Id. at 10–12. 
  From a lending perspective, the system 
 113. See, e.g., Jeff Pope, Impeding Foreclosures Leave Renters in Limbo, LAS VEGAS SUN, 
Aug. 28, 2008 (reporting that renters often have no knowledge of an impending foreclosure). 
 114. See, e.g., Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 111-22, § 702 (2009) 
(providing a 90-day notice requirement and some tenure protections for renters). 
 115. See, e.g., Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal”  Immigrants Beware: 
Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 1, 26 (2007) (“[T]he plenary powers doctrine should be applied to broadly preclude 
municipal [immigration] regulation.”).  But see Rick Su, A Localist Reading of Local Immigration 
Regulations, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1619 (2008) (noting that local immigration debates reflect elements 
of traditional conversations about the structure and organization of local communities).  Predatory 
lending is another area of local intervention and resistance.  See, e.g., American Financial 
Services Ass’n v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005) (holding that California state law 
preempts the city of Oakland’s regulations on predatory lending). 
 116. See Willis, supra note 104, at 1231–53. 
In sum, it is unlikely that the mortgage market will self-correct to an equilibrium state in 
which homeowners will consistently avoid buying overly-risky loans, renters will avoid 
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may be too large and complicated to effectively change, encompassing a vast 
array of financial bodies117
In response to these diverse challenges to the regulation of speculation, 
local governments could have performed an important preventative function in 
the last several years.  Instead of reacting to the effects of the housing crisis, 
cities could have regulated the rental market and stabilized neighborhoods 
before the speculative bubble and subsequent crash.  While this sort of 
intervention might have been considered wise had it been implemented before 
the crash, ideas about investor purchasers in the housing market changed when 
the market declined.
 and instruments, insurance products, leveraging 
schemes, regulatory agencies, and information systems with sometimes 
diverging incentives.  Individual lenders may not be properly incentivized to 
curb speculative purchases and banking incentives are likely to encourage 
speculation. 
118  Investor purchasers are now welcomed for injecting 
any capital into the beleaguered market, and for providing rental homes for 
those homeowners whose homes have been foreclosed.119
As the market continues to weaken, investor purchases are approaching 
levels seen during the housing boom.  As one commentator noted, “Real estate 
got just about everyone into trouble in Phoenix, and the thinking seems to be 
that real estate is going to get everyone out.”
 
120
In addition to the public reaction to anti-speculation efforts, there are 
difficult policy questions to consider.  For example, a rental restriction could 
create selection effects: some potential homebuyers might choose not to buy 
because they would not later be able to rent those homes to others.  In a 
  Moreover, the general 
economic recession accompanying the housing crash has increased the demand 
for rental housing by individuals who have lost jobs or housing, and investor 
purchasers are able to fill this void.  The current economic climate and the state 
of the housing market do not immediately suggest that limiting the availability 
of rental housing would be a popular decision. 
 
housing units that are security for overly-risky mortgages, and neighborhoods will benefit 
from all the residential mortgage transactions that take place along their streets. 
Id. at 1184. 
 117. “Seventeen large universal banks accounted for more that half of the $1.1 trillion of 
losses reported by the world’s banks and insurance companies. . . . In view of the huge losses 
suffered by these institutions, and the extraordinary governmental assistance they received, they 
are clearly the epicenter of the global financial crisis.”  Wilmarth, supra note 8, at 968. 
 118. See Lefcoe, supra note 11, at 15–16 (noting the usefulness of investor purchases in the 
current market). 
 119. See, e.g., David Streitfeld, Amid Rubble of Housing Bust, One City Begins a New Frenzy, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2009 at A1 (“Absentee buyers, who can be either investors or individuals 
purchasing a vacation property, bought nearly 4 of every 10 homes sold in the Phoenix 
metropolitan area in April [2009].”). 
 120. Id. 
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perfectly tailored, anti-speculation and anti-rental provision, the class of people 
deterred from purchasing a home would only include would-be speculators.  In 
the actual implementation of such a provision, however, a larger class might be 
captured and harmed.  A related concern involves efficiency: policy makers 
must evaluate the cost associated with the loss of two sets of buyers in these 
“lost” transactions—the would-be first-order buyers (speculators) and the 
second-order, end-user buyers (purchasers from speculators)—as well as the 
loss of rental opportunities during the holding period.121
Finally, policy makers should evaluate the potential gains of anti-
speculation regulation.  While there has been extensive discussion about the 
frequency and potential harms associated with speculative real estate purchases 
over the last decade,
 
122 it is not clear that eliminating speculation would have 
prevented housing price increases.  There are some examples of communities 
attempting to make this correlation in real estate transactions, though none 
with conclusive results.  For example, Vermont has imposed a land gains tax 
on land speculation.123  Established in 1973, the land gains tax imposes a 
substantial tax on capital gain from “short-term, high-profit sales of Vermont 
land.”124  A 1981 study found that the tax deterred some speculative purchases, 
but the study was unable to draw any conclusions about the effect of the tax on 
land prices.125
Perhaps rental restrictions on homeownership are a clumsy and over-
inclusive attempt to disaggregate shelter values.  A better approach might 
focus on expanding individual ownership choices, instead of increasing 
community mandates.  Existing approaches that attempt to separate 
homeownership from investment risk include equity insurance programs, 
collectivized equity housing, shared appreciation and shared equity models, 
 
 
 121. Lee Anne Fennell, Adjusting Alienability, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1403, 1440–42 (2009).  
Fennell brought welcome attention to an area of property law that has received relatively less 
analysis.  Navigating the choices and outcomes between an injunction or damages, described 
famously as property rules and liability rules in a highly influential article, Guido Calabresi & A. 
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972), has dominated the academic literature on property.  
Much less attention has been paid to the inalienability alternatives described in the same article. 
 122. See, e.g., Virginia Heffernan, For Armchair Flippers, Speculation as Spectator Sport, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2005, at F1; J.M. Kalil, California Investor Calls Valley Market an 
“Interesting Ride,”  LAS VEGAS REV. J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 8A (discussing an investor’s experience 
in the Las Vegas Valley housing market). 
 123. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 10001 (1973). 
 124. Baker & Andersen, supra note 97, at 4. 
 125. Id. at 50.  Notably, Vermont also employs a comprehensive, statewide land use planning 
scheme, suggesting that anti-speculation measures can be effective components of thoughtful land 
use strategies rather than isolated expressions of land use policy.  VT. STAT. ANN. tit, 10 §§ 
6001–6101 (1973). 
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and home equity hedges.126  Professor Fennell builds on these existing 
approaches to suggest a market-oriented strategy—a “homeownership 2.0”—to 
decouple the shelter and investment strands of homeownership and offer 
components of each strand for sale in a sophisticated market.127  Under this 
approach, the effect of speculators on a community (and consequently on a 
particular house) would be considered an “offsite risk” that individual property 
owners may want to contract out of.128
Identifying speculators and crafting a proportionate and accurate response 
pose difficult challenges.  Because the effects of speculation hit hardest at the 
individual and neighborhood level, local governments become the likely first 
responders to these harms, but they should not be the only entities to address 
speculation.  The market needs to realign lending incentives and rules, and 
federal and state authorities must monitor lending practices and increase 
regulation when necessary.  Local governments have a long history addressing 
the economic and social issues that affect neighborhood character, however, 
and should play a significant role in applying this experience to residential real 
estate speculation, a developing threat to the economic stability of families and 
communities. 
 
C. Protecting Community Character or Exclusion? 
Municipalities have a long history of using land use policies to shape the 
character of communities.  This history suggests that rental restrictions may 
have the effect or intent of excluding the most economically vulnerable 
residents from neighborhoods, perhaps in violation of Fair Housing laws and 
related protections.129
Municipalities can best address these concerns by adopting housing 
policies promoting longer-term occupancy by both renters and owners, and by 
ensuring an adequate supply of affordable rental housing—both short and 
long-term—in the community.  Instead of a policy aimed at renters as a class, 
  Rental restrictions raise legitimate concerns about the 
exclusion of renters as a class, and the exclusion of residents who are 
politically and economically vulnerable.  The challenge for municipalities is in 
promoting rentals as a housing choice, while still maintaining restrictions on 
those rentals.  To accomplish this, however, it is first necessary to dispel the 
idea that homeowners are per se more valuable to a community than renters.  
Next, it is important to ensure there are adequate opportunities for rental 
housing in communities.  Finally, municipalities must closely police rental 
regulations for exclusionary effects prohibited by state law or by the Fair 
Housing Act. 
 
 126. Fennell, supra note 1, at 1064–69. 
 127. Id. at 1054–63. 
 128. Id. at 1049. 
 129. See discussion infra Part III.C.3. 
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rental restrictions on homeowners should be carefully crafted to prevent 
speculators from using short-term renters to subsidize their house purchases. 
1. Long Term Community Stakeholders 
The importance of the duration of occupancy in a community—rather than 
the form (rental or homeownership) of the occupancy—was emphasized in a 
recent examination of laws encouraging and protecting homeownership: 
Tenure plays a critical role with long-term renters increasing social capital at 
levels only slightly lower than homeowners.  Stable neighborhoods with higher 
proportions of long-term residents, both owners and renters, have increased 
local participation, greater reciprocated exchange of favors, more linkages 
between children and adults in the community, increased home values, and 
higher levels of neighborhood sociability.130
Similarly, some commentators suggest that studies favoring homeownership or 
criticizing rentals are overstated and that homeownership has received the 
benefit of favorable laws and policies since the colonial era.
 
131
Many communities enact rental restrictions out of fear that short-term 
renters will adversely affect property values, or that renters will not maintain 
their houses as well as homeowners.  These communities may fear that owners 
with a short-term outlook may rent property without maintaining it, instead 
trying to extract as much income as possible,
 
132 while renters with a similarly 
short-term outlook may engage in socially undesirable behavior.  While renters 
in general have little incentive to maintain the exterior of a house, short-term 
renters are even less motivated to care for the house or contribute to 
neighborhood character.  Restrictions on short-term vacation rentals also 
reflect a fear of large gatherings, with the attendant disruptive effects of noise 
and traffic on the surrounding community.133
 
 130. Stern, supra note 1, at 1125–26. 
 
 131. Donald A. Krueckeberg, The Grapes of Rent: A History of Renting in a Country of 
Owners, 10 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 9, 11 (1999).  Similarly, the value of homeownership in 
raising levels of community social capital is questionable.  See Stern, supra note 1, at 1122–24. 
 132. Duncan Kennedy, The Effect of the Warranty of Habitability on Low Income Housing: 
“Milking” and Class Violence, 15 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 485, 489–90 (1987). 
 133. See supra Part II.D. Communities enacting these rental restrictions might point to studies 
showing that Section 8 subsidized housing can have a detrimental effect on neighborhood 
housing values. George C. Galster et al., The Impact of Neighbors Who Use Section 8 Certificates 
on Property Values, 10 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 879 (1999).  These studies, however, do not 
capture the effects of nonsubsidized rental housing.  Or, municipalities might point to the 
beneficial price effects and social effects of homeownership in a community.  See, e.g., Chengri 
Deng & Gerrit-Jan Knaap, Property Values in Inner-City Neighborhoods: The Effects of 
Homeownership, Housing Investment, and Economic Development, 13 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 701 
(2002) (studying neighborhood property values in Cleveland); Eduardo M. Peñalver, Property as 
Entrance, 91 VA. L. REV. 1889, 1948–50 (2005) (discussing the increased rates of mobility of 
renters and the connection of homeowners to the communities they live in). 
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Ideally, purchasers will self select, choosing communities with a package 
of amenities that are valuable to the particular consumer.134
Moreover, the McGlothin case suggests that some purchasers will not be 
able to internalize their preferences for long-term owner occupancy.
  Alienation 
restrictions therefore become a sorting mechanism, distinguishing between 
those consumers who desire a long-term relationship with a community from 
those who have a shorter time horizon.  This focus on long-term occupancy 
suggests that communities using rental restrictions to limit speculation need to 
determine beforehand which purchasers intend to hold properties for the long 
term, and which are shorter-term speculators, a significant regulatory 
challenge. 
135  In 
other words, unforeseen events can arise that may cause owners to shift 
preferences.  It is unclear whether the McGlothins knew of the owner 
occupancy requirement when they purchased their unit, or only learned about it 
later.  It is clear, however, that once their circumstances changed, they did not 
want to be held to that preference.136
2. Supply of Affordable Housing 
  Cities and communities need to be aware 
of these individualized limitations to a potential regulatory scheme and craft 
rental restrictions accordingly. 
Rental restrictions can also reduce the overall supply of rental housing, 
which disproportionately affects lower income residents who cannot afford a 
home.  This type of rental housing reduction could negatively impact the 
existing shortage of affordable housing in communities nationwide.  It is be 
important, then, that a community employing rental restrictions in parts of the 
community maintain an adequate supply of affordable rental housing 
elsewhere in the community.137
A municipality may find it too difficult to demonstrate, practically or 
politically, that it is successfully maintaining an adequate supply of affordable 
 
 
 134. A similar point may be made about information asymmetries.  Fennell notes that 
restrictions on alienation may help to overcome information asymmetries by allowing potential 
purchasers to self-select based on their preferences rather than relying on some form of 
governmental agency to select purchasers based on the agency’s assessment of their suitability.  
Fennell, supra note 121, at 1453–55.  Here, individual purchasers can decide whether they will be 
long term or short-term members of the community based on their desire to purchase a house 
burdened by rental restrictions. 
 135. Villas West II of Willowridge Homeowners Ass’n v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 1284 
(Ind. 2008). 
 136. Id. at 1277–78. 
 137. Many state statutes require local governments to include a Housing Element within their 
master planning process.  What must be included in the Housing Element varies from state to 
state, but California requires that local jurisdictions assess their affordable housing needs and 
form specific strategies to address these needs. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65583 (West Supp. 2009). 
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housing while employing rental restrictions.  Municipalities might hope that 
rental restrictions on homeowners in some communities would check 
speculation and curb inflated housing prices, thereby preserving affordable 
housing generally.  Cities might also assume that restrictions on rentals in 
some communities would not preclude an adequate supply of rentals in other 
communities.  The danger, however, is that rental restrictions would have a 
minimal impact on speculation or escalating housing prices, while affordable 
housing remained scarce generally.  This could create a “race to the bottom,” 
with each community adopting renter exclusion policies out of fear that it 
could become the dumping ground for all of the region’s renters.138
While an anti-speculation ordinance should have a goal of preserving 
affordable housing by preventing rampant price inflation, the ordinance might 
unintentionally make housing less affordable.  This result seems less likely if 
local governments used rental restrictions as one component of an integrated 
regulatory scheme.  A local government could thus limit speculation and 
promote affordable housing through other land use policies. 
 
3. Illegal Exclusion 
Municipalities have historically employed exclusionary housing policies, 
and deserve the skepticism surrounding policies limiting some tenure types in 
favor of others.  One commentator described these impermissible, exclusionary 
zoning policies as ones that “keep[] out lower-income households in three 
main ways: (1) by raising the cost of housing generally, (2) by restricting 
supply of low-income housing types and mandating minimum land and 
housing purchases, and (3) by zoning out families with school-aged 
children.”139
Regulating land use through comprehensive zoning regimes has 
historically been associated with exclusion.  The Supreme Court first upheld 
 
 
 138. In a race to the bottom, actors engage in increasing retaliatory behavior trying to seek 
advantage from each other and preventing disadvantage.  This term is used in a variety of legal 
and policy contexts, and it is frequently used to describe the competition among states for 
corporations and the states’ corresponding adjustment of their corporate regulations.  See, e.g., 
Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (arguing that the federal 
government influences the conventional race to the bottom story). 
 139. Henry Span, How the Courts Should Fight Exclusionary Zoning, 32 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2001).  Another challenge of rental restrictions is that they may foster communities of 
like-interested homeowners which may negatively impact political participation and debate.  In 
other words, housing policies that focus on owner occupied homes elevate the importance 
homeownership itself—to the detriment of other forms of housing tenure. “[W]ith greater 
homogeneity one can expect political debate to be more narrowly economistic, focused only on 
the fiscal aspects of taxation and government action and their effect on the value of one’s perhaps 
primary investment, one’s home.  If one’s interests and values are similar, then there is not much 
to debate.  Politics becomes ‘the administration of things’ rather than the government of people.”  
Id. at 17–18. 
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comprehensive zoning largely out of fear of the effects of apartments on the 
economic and social values of single-family home communities.140  Local 
communities have long attempted to exclude some residents for racial and 
economic reasons.141  State and federal actors have responded by enacting 
planning and zoning laws to deter local communities from excluding 
vulnerable populations,142 and by enacting fair housing enforcement measures 
that police impermissible discriminatory conduct.143
McGlothin provides a useful illustration of exclusionary arguments.  The 
McGlothin rental restrictions were evaluated under the Fair Housing Act 
(FHA), and the case ultimately turned on how the court balanced the perceived 
problem of renters in the community with the solution offered by the no-rental 
provisions.  On appeal, the court adopted a burden shifting approach to 
analyzing the restrictions under the FHA: 
 
[A] plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that a policy or 
practice actually or predictably has a significantly adverse or disproportionate 
impact on a protected class.  To rebut this showing, the defendant must 
demonstrate that its policy or practice has a manifest relationship to a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest.  The plaintiff may then overcome the 
defendant’s showing by demonstrating that a less discriminatory alternative 
would serve the defendant’s legitimate interest equally well.144
 
 140. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 394 (1926) (noting the 
pernicious effect of apartment houses on communities of detached houses: “With particular 
reference to apartment houses, it is pointed out that the development of detached house sections is 
greatly retarded by the coming of apartment houses, which has sometimes resulted in destroying 
the entire section for private house purposes; that in such sections very often the apartment house 
is a mere parasite, constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive 
surroundings created by the residential character of the district.”). 
 
 141. A good description of exclusionary zoning practices and legal remedies can be found in 
JULIAN CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND 
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAW 214–51 (2007).  See also CHARLES M. HAAR, SUBURBS 
UNDER SIEGE: RACE, SPACE, AND AUDACIOUS JUDGES (1996) (focusing on suburban racial and 
economic integration in New Jersey). 
 142. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Judging remedies: Judicial Approaches to Housing 
Segregation, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 309–19 (2002) (discussing New Jersey’s Mount 
Laurel litigation and regulatory structure); Ngai Pindell, Planning for Housing Requirements, in 
THE LEGAL GUIDE TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING DEVELOPMENT 3, 5–19, 31–38 (Tim Iglesias & 
Rochelle E. Lento eds., 2005) (discussing affordable housing state planning requirements in 
California, New Jersey, Florida and Minnesota and federal housing planning requirements). 
 143. See, e.g., The Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
3601–3619 (2006).  See generally ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION: LAW AND 
LITIGATION (2009). 
 144. Villas West II of Willowsridge Homeowners Ass’n v. McGlothin, 885 N.E.2d 1274, 
1283 (Ind. 2008).  The court could have adopted a balancing test in which a disparate impact 
claim succeeds under the FHA when the defendant’s actions produce a discriminatory effect and, 
balancing four factors, relief under disparate impact is appropriate. 
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The court’s burden shifting analysis bears some structural similarity to the 
analyses in other owner-occupancy cases outside of the FHA.145  The plaintiff, 
McGlothin, claimed that the no-rental provision had a disparate impact on 
African Americans because a greater proportion of African Americans rent 
homes than do whites.146  The burden then shifted to the Homeowners 
Association to offer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the no-rental 
provision: the provision excluded renters from the community because renters 
do not maintain their homes as well as owners.147  The burden then shifted 
back to McGlothin to show that the reason was pretext, which she did by citing 
a number of covenant provisions focusing on the extensive maintenance 
obligations of unit owners, which the owners were responsible for if the renter 
did not perform them.148  McGlothin argued that the Association’s claims of 
renter misconduct or inaction “lack[ed] a factual basis, and [were] mere 
subterfuge, rendering [the no-rental provision] unnecessary and useless.”149
The ordinance survived McGlothin’s FHA challenge because the 
Homeowners Association was able to articulate a purpose of the no rental 
restrictions that was not equally served by other covenant provisions: the other 
maintenance provisions were “not equally effective means of maintaining 
property values.”
 
150  Maintaining a property goes beyond mere repair and 
general maintenance, and extends to updates and improvements.  The 
McGlothin’s covenants, therefore, did not oblige owners to improve or update 
the house, only to maintain it.  Unlike renters, owner-occupiers “have an 
incentive to improve and update because they can both enjoy the 
improvements and reap the fruits of their labor upon selling the home.”151
In contrast, the St. Bernard Parish ordinance is likely to have a harder time 
surviving FHA analysis because the Parish had a history of racial segregation 
 
 
The four factors are (1) the strength of the plaintiff’s showing of discriminatory effect; (2) 
evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy the constitutional standard 
of Washington v. Davis; (3) the defendant’s interest in the challenged conduct; and (4) 
whether the plaintiff seeks affirmative relief or merely to restrain the defendant from 
interfering with individual property owners who wish to provide housing. 
Id. at 1281 (citing Metro. Housing Dep’t Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 
1290 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
 145. See supra examples in Part II. 
 146. Villas West II, 885 N.E.2d at 1283. 
 147. Id. at 1283–84. 
 148. “These covenants require homeowners to, among other things, maintain windows, door 
hardware, patios, and appliances; water lawns and shrubs; keep the exterior free of trash, certain 
signs, certain communication devises, and certain vehicles; and ‘promptly perform all 
maintenance and repair . . . which if neglected, might adversely affect any other Dwelling, 
Common Area or the value of the Property.”  Id. at 1284. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Villas West II, 885 N.E.2d at 1284 
PINDELL_ARTICLE.DOCX   
2009] HOME SWEET HOME? THE EFFICACY OF RENTAL RESTRICTIONS 77 
before Hurricane Katrina, tainting the post-hurricane rental ordinance.  In 
2000, the Parish was 88.3% white, 7.6% African-American, and 5.09% 
Hispanic.152  Moreover, “[w]hites own[ed] virtually all owner-occupied 
housing in St. Bernard Parish—93% of all owner-occupied units in the Parish.  
African Americans, in contrast, own[ed] only 4.5% of owner-occupied 
units.”153  Adding to this disparity, the need for rental housing in the 
community is proportionately more acute for minorities than for non-
minorities: 21% of white residents lived in rental housing in 2000 compared to 
31% of African Americans.154  The hurricane only intensified the rental needs 
of African Americans, as almost all of the rental units in the Parish were 
damaged by the hurricane.155
In communities with a history of racial discrimination or disparity, the 
exclusionary zoning implications of a no-rental restriction would be difficult 
for an anti-speculation ordinance to overcome.  The racial history of the 
community matters, as does the extent of efforts by the jurisdiction to 
document the magnitude and effect of speculative purchases in the community. 
 
D. Violations of Constitutional, Statutory, or Common Law Provisions 
In addition to the policy concerns outlined above, rental restrictions on 
homeowners are susceptible to a variety of legal challenges including takings, 
due process, and the authority of the jurisdiction to pass such a measure.156
 
 152. Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Declaratory Judgment, and Remedial Relief 
at 4, Greater New Orleans Fair Hous. Action Ctr. v. St. Bernard Parish, No. 2:06-CV-07185 (E.D. 
La. Nov. 2, 2006). 
  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 4–5. 
 155. Id. at 5 (stating that 97% of the Parish’s rental units were damaged).  “An estimated 
272,000 of those displaced by Hurricane Katrina in Orleans Parish were African-American, 
accounting for 73% of the population in the Parish affected by the hurricane.” Id. at 5. 
 156. Some homeowners may argue that an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.  The St. 
Bernard Parish court upheld the ordinance stating that the permit requirements did not give 
unfettered discretion to the Parish Council to deny a rental permit, and applicants had a 
reasonable opportunity to ascertain what is required of them during the permit process.  Baker v. 
St. Bernard Parish Council, No. 08-1303, 2008 WL 4681373, at *10 (E.D. La. Oct. 21, 2008). 
 An ordinance may face a claim that it violates the dormant Commerce Clause by 
discriminating against out-of-state investors.  This principle explores whether a law adversely and 
impermissibly affects interstate commerce.  Id. at *11.  The court cited a two-step analysis for 
dormant Commerce Clause violations.  Step one is to determine: 
whether the challenged statute regulates evenhandedly with only ‘incidental’ effects on 
interstate commerce, or discriminates against interstate commerce either on its face or in 
practical effect. . . . If the law affirmatively discriminates against out-of-state interests, it 
is subject to stricter scrutiny and will be upheld only if it is necessary to achieve a 
legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives.  Id. at *12. 
PINDELL_ARTICLE.DOCX   
78 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIX:41 
This section will briefly explore the contours of these arguments and probable 
municipal responses. 
1. Takings 
Homeowners could argue that a rental restriction takes their property 
without compensation.  This claim could take one of two forms:157 a claim that 
the regulation deprives a property owner of all of the property’s economic 
value,158 or a claim that the regulation goes “too far” under the 
circumstances.159  Before reaching a full-fledged takings analysis, however, a 
federal court must first decide if the claim is ripe for adjudication.160  To be 
ripe, the applicable government entity must have reached a final decision on an 
application involving the property and the applicant must have exhausted state 
compensation procedures, unless these procedures are unavailable or 
inadequate.161
In St. Bernard Parish Council, the court determined the case was not ripe 
for adjudication.
  A ripeness review prevents federal courts from becoming a sort 
of super-zoning board in cases where state procedures are available to address 
the conflicts. 
162  The homeowners argued that the Parish had delayed the 
processing of their rental applications to such a degree that either the delay 
itself was a taking, or that the delay prevented the plaintiffs from seeking state 
administrative remedies.163  The court rightly noted that even if the permit 
processing delay was long, it fell well short of the extraordinary delay 
necessary to invoke a takings remedy.164
 
In St. Bernard Parish, the court determined that the plaintiffs did not offer enough evidence to 
demonstrate that the Parish Council impermissibly favored local landowners or disfavored 
absentee, out-of-state investors.  Id. at *11. 
  In Tahoe, for example, the Supreme 
Court did not find a taking had occurred, despite the fact that property owners 
 157. Homeowners might claim that the rental restrictions are an impermissible governmental 
condition on development in excess of the particular development’s impact on the local 
community.  If rental restrictions are made as part of a generally applicable ordinance or through 
a development agreement, the restrictions should not run afoul of exactions prohibitions limiting 
what the government can require for a particular land use approval.  See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal 
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 158. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). 
 159. Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 
U.S. 172, 186 (1985). 
 160. Id. at 186–87. 
 161. Id. at 186. 
 162. Baker v. St. Bernard Parish Council, No. 08-1303, 2008 WL 4681373, at *7 (E.D. La. 
Oct. 21, 2008). 
 163. Id. at *6–7. 
 164. Id. at *7. 
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suffered a nearly three-year development moratorium.165  Moreover, a delay in 
application processing did not excuse the plaintiff’s failure to pursue state 
administrative and judicial remedies first.166
Assuming a case is ripe for adjudication, homeowners still face an uphill 
battle proving a takings claim.  A homeowner will have a difficult time arguing 
that a rental restriction made a property worthless.  Even with a rental 
restriction, one can imagine some value as an owner-occupied unit; several 
courts have considered and rejected takings claims based on rental restrictions 
by finding that other, significant economic uses remain.
 
167
Under a balancing test, as illustrated by Penn Central, a court will examine 
the economic impact of the regulation, the character of the government 
activity, and the reasonable investment-backed expectations of the owner.
 
168
2. Due Process 
  
The economic impact of the regulation may vary depending on market 
conditions, but there will always be some significant value in a sale to a new 
owner.  To the extent that a court characterizes the ordinances as unusual, 
rather than as ordinary land use regulations, the ordinances may receive 
increased scrutiny under a challenge to the character of the government 
activity.  Finally, an evaluation of the investment-backed expectations of the 
owner may depend on how broadly the ordinance is applied.  If the ordinance 
is applied to purchasers—speculators and others—who have already bought 
homes, then the ordinance would likely have a severe impact on the owners’ 
investment-backed expectations.  The impact on these expectations would be 
reduced, however, if the ordinance were applied more narrowly to new 
purchasers.  In short, while some of the prongs of a takings analysis could 
apply to a rental restriction ordinance, it is unlikely that a takings claim would 
ultimately prevail. 
Rental restrictions should not face procedural due process claims, as long 
as they were part of generally applicable legislative acts or quasi-legislative 
decisions.  The St. Bernard Parish ordinance, for example, “was a legislative 
decision of broad applicability by an elected City Council, and hence no 
procedural due process rights attach[ed].”169
 
 165. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. v. Tahoe Regulatory Planning, 535 U.S. 302, 312, 341–42 (2002) 
(finding no taking as a result of a 32-month moratorium on development around Lake Tahoe). 
 
 166. Baker v. St. Bernard Parish Council, No. 08-1303, 2008 WL 4681373, at *6–7 (E.D. La. 
Oct. 21, 2008). 
 167. See Ewing v. City of Carmel-By-The-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 389 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); 
Palmieri v. Town of Babylon, No. 01CV1399(SJ), 2006 WL 1155162 at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 
2006), aff’d, 277 Fed. App’x. 72 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 168. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
 169. Baker, 2008 WL 4681373 at *8. 
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Substantive due process challenges to generally applicable zoning 
regulations—questioning whether an ordinance is arbitrary, unreasonable, or 
capricious—are generally subject to a rational basis review.170  Again, in St. 
Bernard Parish, plaintiffs argued that the ordinance had no legitimate public 
purpose and was unduly oppressive.171  The court noted that homeowners 
would have a difficult time demonstrating that any ordinance has no rational 
basis, and found that the Parish’s stated purpose for the Ordinance—stabilizing 
the housing market and encouraging the return of single-family home 
owners—was rational and permissible.172
Not only were the goals of the St. Bernard Parish ordinance permissible, 
but the means to achieve those goals were also permissible.  “The law does not 
permit this Court to review whether the Ordinance will in fact stabilize the 
rental market in St. Bernard Parish, or to question whether defendant’s 
legislation and the means it employs is the best way to achieve this goal, or 
even whether St. Bernard Parish could achieve its goal in a less restrictive 
manner.”
 
173
3. Authority 
  In short, jurisdictions should meet substantive due process 
challenges if the jurisdiction can produce some findings connecting the 
regulated activity—in this case residential speculation—to community harm. 
Municipalities may also face challenges from homeowners who argue that 
the municipality lacks the legal authority to implement a rental restriction.  
Generally, municipalities possess only the authority and powers the state 
government grants them.174  This grant of power may be relatively large and 
general as in a home rule jurisdiction,175
 
 170. See, e.g., State v. Germane, 971 A.2d 555, 584 (R.I. 2009) (applying substantive due 
process to the Sexual Offender Registration and Community Notification Act); Harbit v. City of 
Charleston, 675 S.E.2d 776, 782 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009) (applying a “reasonable relationship” test 
to a denial of a rezoning application).  Some jurisdictions might impose a higher standard of 
review such as requiring a “real and substantial” relationship between the purpose of the 
ordinance and the exercise of police power.  See, e.g., Hanna v. City of Chicago, 771 N.E.2d 13, 
22 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (outlining a six factor test). 
 or it may be more narrowly construed 
as in Dillon’s Rule states.  In Dillon’s Rule states, municipalities may exercise 
 171. Baker, 2008 WL 4681373 at *9 (“The ‘unduly oppressive’ nature of the ordinance 
includes the process and criteria for obtaining a Permit, the disclosures required for obtaining a 
permit, the $250 application fee, and potential penalties for violating the Ordinance.”). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at *10. 
 174. Local governments have only the legal authority granted to them by the state and have 
no inherent legal powers.  See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I – The Structure of Local 
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1990). 
 175. See GERALD E. FRUG & DAVID J. BARRON, CITY BOUND: HOW STATES STIFLE URBAN 
INNOVATION 60–74 (2008).  See generally David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. 
L. REV. 2257 (2003) (discussing the concept of home rule and its effect on suburban sprawl). 
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only those powers expressly granted by the state, powers implied from express 
grants, or powers necessarily incidental to express grants.176
While home rule jurisdictions generally have more expansive powers, it is 
simplistic to assume that those jurisdictions will necessarily possess—or 
express—more autonomy than Dillon’s Rule jurisdictions.  Much depends on 
the risk tolerance of local politicians to enact legislation that pushes the 
boundaries of local authority, the willingness of the state legislature to closely 
police (or not) local initiatives, and the reviewing court’s interpretation of 
those initiatives as within prescribed bounds or as outside of conventional 
practice.
 
177
The conflict between these two views of rental restrictions is well 
illustrated in a New Jersey case, Repair Master, Inc. v. Borough of 
Paulsboro.
  Under this analysis, a rental restriction could be viewed in one of 
two ways.  It could be an application of a local jurisdiction’s long-recognized 
power to regulate land uses under its zoning authority, or protect public health 
and safety under its police power.  Or the restriction could be seen as 
exceeding traditional zoning practices and outside of a jurisdiction’s grant of 
authority from the state legislature. 
178  The city of Paulsboro felt it had too much renter-occupied 
housing and too few owner-occupied units.  The city commissioned a study, 
which confirmed this imbalance and concluded the “excessive presence of 
rental tenure throughout the municipality has adversely impacted the socio-
economic fabric of the community . . . , including the housing market, the 
commercial real estate market, the municipal tax base, demand for police 
services, incidence of code enforcement violations, and increased presence of 
children-at-risk throughout the local school system.”179  As a result of these 
findings, the city passed a moratorium on the issuance of rental licenses for 
single-family and non-owner-occupied duplex units.180
The appellate court’s view of the ordinance was mixed.  The court seemed 
genuinely sympathetic to and supportive of the city’s homeownership goals.  
For several years, the city had worked with federal, state, local, private, and 
faith-based initiatives to increase homeownership, including efforts to 
rehabilitate vacant and abandoned housing.
 
181
 
 176. Briffault, supra note 174, at 8. 
  The court was not overly 
concerned that the city was applying exclusionary policies and “[did] not doubt 
the Borough’s alleged laudable motives to revitalize its owner-occupied 
 177. See DAVID BARRON ET AL., DISPELLING THE MYTH OF HOME RULE: LOCAL POWER IN 
GREATER BOSTON 9–12 (2004) (exploring the legal and practical limitations on local power 
among home rule cities). 
 178. 799 A.2d 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002). 
 179. Id. at 601. 
 180. Id. at 600. 
 181. Id. at 601. 
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housing stock.”182
While the appellate court’s view was mixed, the lower court objected to 
the commissioned study’s generalized conclusions about the socio-economic 
impact of rental properties.  The city’s moratorium impacted all single-family 
rentals and “[i]t is a stretch of logic to make the conclusion that a particular 
rental property would contribute to social problems which the municipality is 
attempting to address.”
  In other words, the court did not believe the city was trying 
to exclude lower income residents in favor of higher income residents. 
183  In other words, not every renter presents socio-
economic problems, and not every child of those renters presents special 
educational problems.184
The characterization of the rental restriction in Repair Master was 
significant to the court’s holding.  Local land use goals are necessarily broad, 
and to the extent a jurisdiction can rationally connect the regulatory method to 
the broad goal, the regulation will likely be upheld.  A rental restriction 
becomes vulnerable, however, if it is too blunt and powerful to address local 
social problems that other local regulations, such as nuisance and code 
enforcement measures, could also address.
 
185  The court in Repair Master 
ultimately found that the city lacked the authority “to ban a class of housing 
occupants or deny an owner a substantial attribute of ownership and possession 
of real estate.”186  While the court did discuss implied authority,187
Of course, the regulation of physical use is often intended to impact social 
and economic relationships within the community.  What the Repair Master 
court seemed particularly concerned with was the problem of over-inclusion; 
the regulation included too many innocent people within its prohibitions.  If the 
city was concerned about the impact of disruptive people on quiet 
neighborhoods, an appropriate response would be to monitor the behavior of 
 the court 
ultimately supported its conclusion by citing a series of cases in which cities 
unsuccessfully attempted to regulate perceived anti-social conduct through 
zoning codes.  The court saw the proper function of zoning as regulating the 
physical use of property, and not addressing perceived anti-social conduct. 
 
 182. Id. 
 183. Repair Master, 799 A.2d at 603. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 606–07. 
 186. Id. at 606. 
 187. The city listed twenty-one examples of regulatory activities cities had engaged in that 
were upheld as valid exercises of implied authority.  Id. at 604–06.  New Jersey cities had no 
express authority to require owners of large multiple dwellings to provide armed security guards, 
regulate automobile sales lots, or regulate hours of business operation for example.  But New 
Jersey courts had upheld these and other activities, finding that cities had implied authority.  Not 
finding authority for the rental moratorium, the court that the list was “impressive but not 
persuasive in the Borough’s favor.”  Id. at 606. 
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those individuals, and not to prevent a group of unrelated people from living 
together.188
A speculation ordinance that similarly swept too broadly could be 
addressed by an enforcement scheme allowing homeowners to rent in certain, 
prescribed circumstances.  For example, the McGlothin outcome suggests that 
an exception should be made if an owner occupant dies and the surviving 
occupant, or an executor of the estate, wants to rent the home.
 
189  The 
Anderson ordinance contained an exception for medical reasons or defined 
leaves of absence.190
IV.  CONCLUSION 
  An enforcement scheme with these types of exceptions 
mitigates some of the impact on individual homeowners, which would result 
from a complete moratorium, and would be more likely to survive a challenge. 
Alienation restrictions on homeowners appear in a surprising number of 
contexts—they are not isolated, extreme occurrences.  These restrictions could 
be a potentially useful complement to a comprehensive regulatory approach, 
but they are not without risks.  More work needs to be done to examine how 
effective local governments could be in identifying, monitoring, and enforcing 
speculative activity. 
Local governments, however, are unlikely to implement rent restrictions to 
the extent suggested in this article.  While local governments are sometimes 
entrepreneurial in their pursuit of authority to act,191 other factors make local 
governments more risk averse.  For example, local governments have limited 
resources to contribute to a diverse number of projects, local constituents can 
be risk averse, and the political consequences of decisions that turn out poorly 
can be significant.192
  
  Whether local governments actually implement anti-
speculation measures in general, or implement rental restrictions in particular, 
to achieve anti-speculation goals, it is useful to consider limitations on 
homeownership generally.  The investment ideal of conventional 
homeownership has remained unquestioned for too long.  Moreover, recent 
economic events demonstrate that more flexibility in ownership models and 
regulatory regimes is necessary to preserve the economic stability of 
individuals and communities.  Local governments—close to their constituents 
and adaptable to change—may be the appropriate sites for new regulatory 
approaches. 
 
 188. See Repair Master, 799 A.2d at 606–07; For a discussion of short term rental bans, see 
supra Part II.D. 
 189. See supra Part II.H. 
 190. Anderson v. Provo City Corp., 108 P.3d 701, 705 (Utah 2005). 
 191. FRUG & BARRON, supra note 175, at 195–96, 232. 
 192. Serkin, supra note 90, at 1666–67. 
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